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THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THE
CHALLENGE OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
TSEMING YANG*
Abstract: EPA's Title VI disparate impact regulations have become a key
component of its efforts to address environmental justice issues.
However, EPA's proposed implementation of these regulations through
its Draft Title VI Guidance raises serious difficulties. Its attempt to
combine civil rights and environmental law doctrines in a whole-sale
fashion exposes significant tensions in the regulatory premises between
these areas of law. The tensions are evident in how the Guidance
approaches issues of minority protections, incommensurable values,
and the limits of regulatory intervention. However, there are also
important parallels that substantive understandings of discrimination
mid environmental degradation share. In particular, the role of ration-
ally self-interested actions in shaping discriminatory and environment-
ally degrading behavior suggests that EPA must not only change how it
regulates but also what its regulations focus on. EPA's Title VI regulation
can serve an important function within such efforts to adjust both the
form of its regulatory approaches as well as the substantive focus of
regulatory solutions.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s and early 1960s, African-American and Caucasian
"Freedom riders" traveled through the South to test state segregation
laws, only to be met with violence. 1 Peaceful protestors, including
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I am grateful to Sheila Foster,
Eileen Gauna, Shubha Ghosh, Cynthia Ho, Gil Kujovich, Susan Kuo, and Kenneth Manas-
ter as well as the participants of the 1999 Asian American Legal Scholarship Workshop for
their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks go to
Elizbeth Brown, Mateo Davis, Albert Huang, Theresa Labriola, Arati Tripathi and espe-
cially Michael O'Brien for legal research, as well as Laura Gillen and Judy Hilts for manu-
script assistance.
I See gnerally ALDON MORRIS, THE OIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 188-274
(1986).
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women and children, marched against discrimination and were at-
tacked by police and mauled by dogs.2 And Governor George Wallace
stood in the "schoolhouse door" to block African-American students
from enrolling at the University of Alabama.3 When newspapers and
television brought pictures of bigotry, officially condoned violence,
and defiance of federal laws into our homes, the President sent fed-
eral marshals, and Congress enacted new and sweeping federal civil
rights protections.4
During those same times, smog made the air in our cities un-
breathable.5 Toxic chemicals and pesticides poisoned humans, ani-
mals, and plant life.6 Our streams and lakes became so polluted that
the Cuyahoga River burned2 When environmentalists and citizens
cried out to the federal government for help, Congress enacted a se-
ries of revolutionary environmental statutes, and the President cre-
ated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).8
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a new movement began. Protestors
engaged in non-violent acts of civil disobedience to prevent the
dumping of toxic wastes in an African-American community in South
Carolina.9 The United Church of Christ published a study document-
ing racial disparities in the siting of hazardous waste facilities.10 Racial
minority plaintiffs brought federal law suits alleging discrimination in
the siting of waste facilities and uniformly lost." Only with the First
People of Color Environmental Summit did Congress, the President,
and environmental regulators begin to pay attention to disparate pol-
2 Id.
3 Id.
4Id.
5 See Rolf R. von Oppenfeld et al., The Common-Law Impetus for Advanced Control of Air
Toxics, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,003 (1999).
6Id.
7 SeeJames Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental Protection in the Service Economy,
30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,856 (2000).
8 See, e.g., PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT 111-20, 129-32 (1993).
9 See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, As in the '60s, Protesters Rally; But This Time The Foe Is PCB,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1982, at Al.10 COMMISSION FOR RACIALJUSTICE (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST), TOxIC WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter
COMMISSION FOR RACIALJUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES].
11 See, e.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991); East Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Assoc. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm., 706 F.
Supp. 880, 844-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp
673, 677-81 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
(Vol. 29:143
HeinOnline  -- 29 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L Rev. 144 2001-2002
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Environmental Justice
lution and toxic burdens visited on racial minority communities and
the poor and the questions of equity and fairness in environmental
regulation. 12
In response to this movement, however, Congress did nothing.
President Clinton issued an unenforceable Executive Order on envi-
ronmental justice.' 3 And EPA created a federal advisory committee as
well as an internal office with no substantive authority but charged
with coordinating the integration of environmental justice into
agency policies and activities.' 4
As the confluence of the two great social movements of the twen-
tieth century, the environmental justice movement's failure to have its
concerns addressed as seriously as its predecessors is striking. As an
explanation of why government has not provided remedies to envi-
ronmental justice claims, scholars have pointed to a lack of political
power of communities of color and the poor 5 Others have also ar-
gued that civil rights laws, and in particular the equal protection doc-
trine, have been largely unable to respond to the discrimination and
distributional inequity claims of the environmental justice movement
because of the significant obstacle that the doctrine's discriminatory
intent requirement creates.' 6
The focus of the most recent efforts to overcome these
difficulties has been EPA's guidance on the investigation of adminis-
trative complaints alleging disparate discriminatory impacts under its
12 See discussion infra Part IA.
13 Exec. Order No. 12,898, §§ 1-101, 6-609, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
14 See UNITED STATES ENIVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NOTICE OF ESTABLISH-
MENT OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL AND REQUEST FOR
SUGGESTIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,723, 59,723-801 (Nov. 10,
1993) [hereinafter EPA NOTICE OF ESTABLISHMENT]; see also Richard J. Lazarus, "Environ-
mental Racism! That's What It Is., "2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 263-64 (2000) (noting the scar-
city of visible responses from Congress, states, and courts to environmental justice claims).
But see id. at 264-73 (claiming important and widespread but relatively invisible changes in
enforcement policy, standards, public participation, and environmental profession in re-
sponse to environmental justice claims).
15 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 806-25 (1993). Such claims have been
made more generally by civil rights scholars about the lesser solicitude of government
toward minority protection concerns. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 158-94 (1992). For an explanation as to why
changing times and politics have made claims for racial and social justice less popular, see
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 518, 524-33 (1980) (arguing that in the 1960s, the fight against segregation served
Caucasian as much as African-American interests).
16 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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regulations implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 These regula-
tions apply to all recipients of EPA financial assistance.18 Since the vast
majority of state and local governments implementing EPA regulatory
programs receive some form of federal financial assistance and since
many allegations of discrimination have involved permits issued by
such state and local government agencies, EPA's Title VI Guidance
has held out great promise for change. 19 Yet the Guidance has been
severely criticized by environmental justice advocates as being seri-
ously deficient.20
Such criticisms have become more important in light of the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval,21 finding that
individual plaintiffs have no private right of action to enforce EPA's
disparate impact regulations directly in court. With doctrinal devel-
opments that make it more difficult for private citizens to directly en-
force EPA's Title VI disparate impact regulations, those wronged will
have to place more reliance on administrative remedies to vindicate
their interests.2 2 But more significantly, EPA's Title VI Guidance is one
of the few attempts to articulate substantive decision-making criteria
17 See Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environ-
mental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for
Investigating Tide VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Inves-
tigation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,667-39,670 (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter Draft
Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance]; see also infra notes 130-131 and
accompanying text.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Letter from Luke W. Cole et al. to Carol Browner, Comments on Draft Revised
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Aug.
26, 2000) (on file with author) (containing comments by 125 environmental organizations
and individuals), available at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/t6com2OOOOl.pdf
(last visited Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Letter from Luke W, Cole]. Public comments on
the Draft Revised Guidance can be found at Comments Received on the Title VIDraft Guidance
Documents, at http://www.epa.gov/civilights/t6guidcom.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Public Comments on Draft Revised Guidance].
21 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1523 (2001).
22 Sandoval does not appear to foreclose all attempts by private citizens to enforce
EPA's Title VI disparate impact regulations. See id. Section 1983 suits may provide an alter-
native remedy that could reach many of the same violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)
(stating "[elvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress .... ); see also Sandova, 121 S. Ct. at 1522 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). But see S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NewJersey Dept. of Envd. Protection, 274
F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). See generally Bradford C. Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's
Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321 (2001).
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for government officials (and industry) interested in acting responsi-
bly with regard to the concerns of the environmental justice move-
ment.23 To the extent that such substantive criteria fail to advance or
protect the very interests of racial minorities, as well as communities
raising environmental justice issues more generally, such failings must
be taken very seriously.
Many of the difficulties that regulators have encountered in ad-
dressing environmental justice issues can be traced to the vastly dif-
ferent regulatory paradigms that environmental regulators and envi-
ronmental justice activists bring to their understanding of the role of
government intervention in solving environmental justice problems. 24
These difficulties have not been resolved in EPA's Title VI Guidance
and raise questions about the effectiveness of the Guidance in solving
environmental justice problems.
Yet, in formulating its Title VI Guidance, EPA has also sought to
rely on approaches that other agencies have used in their implemen-
tation and enforcement of Title VI regulations.25 As a result, the ap-
plication of Title VI to environmental issues also raises larger issues
with regard to the ability of traditional civil rights mechanisms to solve
race and equity problems in environmental regulation. These
difficulties suggest that EPA needs to examine more closely the sub-
stance of the problems raised by activists. It needs to tailor its inter-
ventions specifically to the issues raised rather than routinely adapting
approaches used elsewhere. To address environmental justice issues
effectively, EPA must reshape its regulatory approaches, including its
approach to Title VI, in both form and substance. 26
Part I of this Article provides background on the environmental
justice movement and the problems that it has encountered in seek-
ing remedies under the civil rights and environmental laws.27 Part I
also presents an overview of the Title VI Draft Revised Investigation
Guidance. 28
Part II details the regulatory frameworks of civil rights law and
environmental law that the environmental justice movement has
23 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance supra note 17, at
39,650.
24 See Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental
Justice's Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
2 See, e.g., infra note 233 and accompanying text.
26 See discussion infta Part IV.
27 See discussion infra Part I.
28 See discussion infta Part I.
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brought together.29 These frameworks are based on fundamentally
different regulatory premises with regard to minority protection con-
cerns, the role of incommensurable values in regulatory decision-
making, and the limits of appropriate regulation. Unfortunately, in
implementing its Tide VI Guidance, EPA has not resolved many of the
tensions that have made it difficult to address environmental justice
problems in the first place.
Part III examines the respective underlying substantive social
problems that environmental law and civil rights law seek to address.30
Modern understandings of race discrimination and environmental
degradation view those underlying social problems as resulting in
large part from rationally self-interested actions. These views under-
score that discrimination and environmental degradation occur re-
gardless of evil motivations and that an important role of civil rights
and environmental law in redressing these problems is to change the
incentives that prompt them in the first place. In the end, effective
regulation to redress problems of environmental justice must look
past the traditional conceptions of racial animus and prejudice and
focus on the incentives and disincentives that lead to discriminatory
actions.
Part IV suggests changes that EPA will need to make to incorpo-
rate this understanding of discrimination and environmental justice
into its regulatory framework.31 Because of broad delegation to agen-
cies of regulatory authority over discrimination in federally funded
programs, Title VI provides unique opportunities in this regard.32 In
particular, EPA needs to alter the form of its regulatory decision-
making process, for instance by incorporating adjudicative processes
into its Tide VI process. It will also need to change the substantive fo-
cus of its regulatory efforts by addressing the incentives and biases
that encourage actions with discriminatory outcomes or that perpetu-
ate pre-existing inequities and discrimination. In this regard, its role
within the National Environmental Policy Act3 3 can provide a useful
precedent for an enhanced role within Tide VI as well as its activities
under other environmental statutes.
SSee discussion infra Part II.
30 See discussion infra Part III.
S1 See discussion infra Part IV.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
33 Id. § 4331.
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A. Race, Equity, and the Environment
The environmental justice movement has been one of the most
important influences on environmentalism in recent years.34 Con-
cerns about race, equity, and fairness in environmental protection,
however, have long predated the recent rise of the environmental jus-
tice movement in the United States.35
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, civil rights activists and scholars
commented that the federal government's newfound focus on envi-
ronmental problems might draw resources and attention away from
the lingering effects of a century of state sanctioned segregation and
discrimination.3 6 At the same time, activists and scholars were also
concerned that regulatory efforts themselves would not be focused on
the distributional impacts of environmental regulations on racial mi-
norities.3 7 These concerns fell on deaf ears.38
In 1982, protests about the siting of a hazardous waste facility
among predominately African-American and poor communities in
Warren County, North Carolina, raised race and equity issues in one
of their most concrete forms.3 9 Frequently pointed to as the visible
beginnings of the environmental justice movement, the incident en-
84 See, e.g., THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO AD-
DRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, at xxix-xxxi (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999).
5 Scholars have pointed to the discrimination that African-Americans and other mi-
norities faced with regard to the provisioning of municipal services during the times ofJim
Crow and racial segregation laws as early examples of environmental injustice. See,
e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288-91 (5th Cir. 1971). In posing the dis-
crimination struggle as a fight for equal benefits from government works, they can be seen
as the flip-side of the more recent environmental justice complaints regarding unequal
treatment in the distribution of undesirable land uses. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to
Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 1001, 1003 n.9 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 15, at 807, 833. In both instances, residen-
tial segregation provided an easy mechanism by which municipalities could limit not only
the benefits of municipal services such as sanitary sewers, street lighting, and potable water
supplies, but arguably also the shift of undesirable facilities, such as waste facilities and
polluting industries, to minority neighborhoods. See id.
3 See Lazarus, supra note 15, at 788-89.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 789, 836-38 (noting that EPA made a conscious decision in the early 1970s to
enforce anti-discrimination requirements of Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act less than ag-
gressively).
39 See, e.g., Russakoff, supra note 9, at Al. For further accounts of the history and varied
perspectives of the environmental justice movement, see CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
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gaged African-American and poor individuals in civil rights-style acts
of civil disobedience against the establishment of a polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) waste disposal site within the county.40 Protestors al-
leged racist motivations in the disposal of highly hazardous PCB
wastes in a predominately African-American rural community, yet
regulators refused to intervene. 41 In the end, the community residents
were unable to stop the establishment of the facility.42 But its graphic
images of protestors lying in the roads to block trucks carrying haz-
ardous waste and the disturbing claims of regulatory discrimination
galvanized others into action.43
As a result of this incident, a number of studies, including one by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) and another by the Commis-
sion for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ, inquired into
racial disparities in the correlation between hazardous waste facility
siting and the racial make-up of host communities." The GAO study
found that of four off-site hazardous waste landfills located within the
eight-state jurisdiction of EPA's Region IV, three were located in pre-
dominately African-American communities 45 even though they only
made up twenty percent of the region's population.46 The Commis-
sion for Racial Justice study found that three of every five African and
Hispanic-Americans lived in communities with uncontrolled toxic
waste sites, and that race proved to be the most significant among the
variables tested in association with the location of commercial haz-
ardous waste facilities. 47
A 1992 study by the National Law Journal, examining govern-
ment enforcement of environmental laws at 1177 Superfund toxic
waste sites concluded that "[p]enalties under hazardous waste laws at
40 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRON-
MENTALJUSTICE 17-18 (1998); Russakoff, supra note 9, at Al.
41 See, e.g., Russakoff, supra note 9, at Al.
SSee, e.g., FOREMAN, supra note 40, at 18.
4 See, e.g., Dorceta E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclusion, in CONFRONT-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 39, at 53, 55-56.
44 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES
(1983) [hereinafter U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILLS]; see, e.g., Charles Lee, Beyond Toxic Wastes and Race, in CONFRONTING ENVIRON-
MENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 39, at 41, 43.
45 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS, supra
note 44, at 1, 3.
46 See id.
47 COMMISSION FOR RACIALJUSTICE, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 10, at xiii-xiv.
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sites having the greatest white population were about 500% higher
than penalties at sites with the greatest minority population." 48 The
same study also found that for "all the federal environmental laws
aimed at protecting citizens from air, water and waste pollution, pen-
alties in white communities were 46% higher than in minority com-
munities."49 Many other studies, focusing on other aspects of envi-
ronmental regulation, resulted in similar findings.50
Yet, environmental regulators have not been the only actors con-
nected to discrimination in environmental protection. In earlier
times, in keeping with prevailing attitudes, racist attitudes among en-
vironmentalists and environmental organizations such as the Sierra
Club were also quite common.5 1 More recently, such issues have fo-
cused on the lack of racial minorities on the staffs of such organiza-
tions. 52 But there have also been complaints about the discriminatory
implications of their substantive work, which is directed primarily at
issues, such as wilderness preservation, that have had little relevance
to minority and poor communities. 53 As an extreme example, recent
48 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, A Special Investigation: Unequal Protection: The Ra-
cial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1.
49 Id.
50 For an overview of the studies, see, for example, Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning
Milagros: EnvironmentalJustice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENy. U. L. REv. 1, 16-26 (1998).
Of course, there has been much criticism of these studies. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Analyzing
Evidence of EnvironmentalJustice, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 21 (1995) (suggesting envi-
ronmental racism is not a simple correlation but a complex entanglement of class, race,
educational attainment, and other factors); Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nui-
sance Or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECoL-
OGY L.Q. 1, 33-35 (1997); Michael Greenberg, Proving Environmental Inequity in Siting Lo-
cally Unwanted Land Uses, 4 RISK 235, 250-52 (1993); Thomas Lambert & Christopher
Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195,
203-12 (1997) (finding "no significant difference" in percentages of minority residents in
areas with or without active facilities in St. Louis, MO).
51 See, e.g., CharlesJordan & Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities, and the Mainstream
Environmental Movement, in VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: PERSPECTIVES
FOR A NEW ERA 71, 75-78 (Donald Snow ed., 1992) (noting that several of the Sierra
Club's California chapters prohibited membership by racial minority individuals up until
the 1950s).
52 See, e.g., id. at 78, 90-94, 100-01.
53 See MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 168, 160-66 (1995); see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Amid Board Ran-
co, Sierra Club LDF Loses 2d Black: Staff Attorney Quits and Rekindles Dispute Over Environmental
Racism, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A6 (reporting that former Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund board member equated the NAACP with a "black man's Ku Klux Klan" and de-
scribed the role of an African-American woman judge as chair of the board as "interesting
because in the 40 years I have worked intensely in environmental matters, I have found
total disinterest among children or adults of your race in environmental matters," and
20021
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referenda within the Sierra Club have sought adoption of official
Club positions that would support curbs on legal immigration, with
the publicly asserted rationale of protecting the United States envi-
ronment from the burdens of additional residents.54 The strong nativ-
ist and racist overtones of such efforts were apparent.55 While such
"life-boat" attitudes56 might be explained by self-interested concern
for the environment over other people,5 7 the ties of anti-immigration
policy supporters to well-known racist groups and the primary focus
on immigrants of color showed how disingenuous the environmental
justifications were in deflecting claims of racial bigotry.58
Grass roots organizing and growth of the movement around such
issues eventually culminated in 1991 in the First National People of
Color Environmental Summit and much greater national awareness
about the problems of race and equity in environmental protection. 59
Since then, the movement has been successful in prompting federal
responses at a number of levels. In government, the Clinton Admini-
stration issued a Presidential Executive Order directing federal agen-
noted the total disinterest of African natives, based on their hereditary cultural views, in
the environment as well as the pain and suffering of animals).
54 See, e.g., Frank Clifford, Immigration Vote Divides Sierra Club, LA. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998,
at Al.
5 See id.
56 Intended as a satire in the vein ofJonathan Swift's A MODEST PROPOSAL, Richard D.
Lamm's essay, The Heresy Tral of the Reverend Richard Lamm, 15 ENVTL. L. 755 (1985), pro-
vides an excellent exposition of such attitudes.
57 Garrett Hardin, the author of the seminal article, The ragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968), has been one of the most extreme proponents of deliberate
selfishness in the use of limited natural resources. Thus, he advocated in the 1950s against
the extension of U.S. aid to developing countries, in particular famine relief, because of
his apparent belief that it would be counterproductive to solving global overpopulation.
See, e.g., SHABECOFF, supra note 8, at 94-96 (1993). According to Hardin:
How can we help a foreign country to escape from overpopulation? Clearly
the worst thing we can do is send food .... Atomic bombs would be kinder.
For a few moments the misery would be acute but it would soon come to an
end for most of the people, leaving a few survivors to suffer thereafter.
GARRETT HARDIN, THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM: AN ECOLOGIST'S VIEW OF SURVIVAL (1977).
In more recent times, Hardin has been unabashed in his justification of discrimina-
tion as a form of "kin altruism" in which an individual seeks to benefit only those to whom
he or she might be biologically related, based on the implication that individuals of the
same race are more closely related biologically than between races. GARRETT HARDIN,
LIVING WITHIN LIMITS 230 (1993). According to Hardin, "discrimination is a necessary
part of every persisting altruistic behavior." Id.
5 See, e.g., Ruth Conniff, The War on Aliens: The Right Calls the Shots, THE PROGRESSIVE,
Oct. 1993, at 22.
59 See DOWIE, supra note 53, at 151-55.
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cies to consider the environmental justice implications of their deci-
sion-making.6° Additionally, EPA established internally the Office of
Environmental Justice and created the National Environmental Jus-
tice Advisory Council as an outside advisory body.61 Mainstream envi-
ronmental organizations have also stepped forward by creating proj-
ects and offices to address environmental justice concerns. 62
Moreover, academic attention to environmental justice issues has
mushroomed.63
Of course, concerns about racism and distributional equity have
naturally not been confined to domestic environmental issues alone.64
Within international environmental protection efforts, such concerns
have been labeled as developing country/developed country equity
issues and environmental human rights concerns. These issues have
been raised in the context of environmental devastation due to de-
structive natural resource extraction processes6 or nuclear weapons
testing,66 as well as past dispossession of land for the benefit of expa-
triate settlers during colonial times. 67 While these issues fundamen-
60 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
61 See EPA NOTICE OF ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 14.
62 See, e.g., DOWIE, supra note 53, at 147, 153.
6 See, e.g., Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333
(1997); Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environ-
mentalEquity, and EnvironmentalJustice, 9J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121 (2000).
64 See, e.g., Dana Alston & Nicole Brown, Global Threats to People of Color, in CONFRONT-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 39, at 179, 179-
94.
6See Antony Anghie, "The Heart of My Home": Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and
the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L LJ. 445, 445-48(1993) (discussing international law con-
sequences of destruction of the environment on the island of Nauru during guano min-
ing).
66 See, e.g., Nuclear Tests, (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20, 1974) (discussing New
Zealand's suit in International Court of Justice protesting French atmospheric nuclear
tests in the South Pacific at France's Mururoa atoll); Lori Osmundsen, Paradise Preserved?
The Contribution of the SPREP Convention to the Environmental Welfare of the South Pacific, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 760-63, 771-73 (1992) (discussing weaknesses of nuclear testing
agreements and treaties in the South Pacific).
67 See, e.g., ROBIN PALMER, LAND AND RACIAL DOMINATION IN RHODESIA (1977). See
generally Tseming Yang, International Environmental Protection: Human Rights and the North-
South Divide, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES 87, 94-98 (Kathryn Mutz et al. eds.,
2002). Many of the parallels can be traced back to the history of colonialism and the roles
that developed and developing countries played within it. In such colonial relationships,
the familiar racist ideology of white European racial and cultural superiority over non-
whites furnished much of the justification for the colonial system. Id. Under the mantle of
the civilizing mission of the colonial powers, it was the perceived moral duty of the "civi-
lized" European colonial powers to subjugate the non-white "savages" in order to en-
lighten, educate, and convert them to Christianity. See also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
543, 573 (1823) (noting the justifications used by Europeans for appropriating American
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tally involve the same concerns of participation, fairness, and distribu-
tion that have been raised by environmental justice activists in the
U.S., they have commanded far more attention. 68
This raises a puzzling question. Given the greater significance of
equity issues in international environmental treaties and other regula-
tory efforts, why has the domestic environmental justice movement
been comparatively unsuccessful in achieving substantive solutions to
its complaints? One obvious reason may be attributable to the realities
of state sovereignty and global environmental politics. The moral
force of equity and fairness arguments by developing countries are
backed up by the leverage that sovereign nations may exercise
through their ability to withhold their consent and cooperation with
international efforts to address environmental problems or other ac-
tions desired by developed nations. Thus, resolution of equity and
fairness issues have become top priorities for achieving effective
broad-based solutions to important global environmental problems,
such as climate change. No such leverage is available to domestic en-
lands: "[t]he potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that
they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civili-
zation and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited independence"); see generally Ruth
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'V
903, 930-47 (1997); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 119-232 (1990). These beliefs provided the
moral excuse for colonial powers to exploit land and resources of the non-white colonies,
just as it justified conquest, slavery, and discrimination against people of color within the
United States. See id.
De-colonization and independence of former colonies did not necessarily end such re-
lationships of exploitation and inequality. See, e.g., STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KIN-
ZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1982)
(discussing covert U.S. intervention in Guatemala to protect plantations and lands of the
Boston-based United Fruit Company (now Chiquita)); see also Osmundsen, supra note 66,
at 735-38. More broadly, the consequences of colonial exploitation and inequality con-
tinue to affect global environmental problems, such as ozone depletion and global warm-
ing, where developing countries have been asked to help address what has largely been the
result of past and present contributions to global environmental degradation by developed
countries. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 569-
71, 631-35 (1998).
6 In many international environmental problems, issues of equity have become of
central importance. See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 (enumerating principles for global environmental partnership and
emphasizing that the needs of the least developed and most environmentally vulnerable
countries shall be given special priority); United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, May 19, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (stating that parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations on the basis of equity); see generally
JOYEETA GUPTA, THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FROM
CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS? (1997) (examining the imbalance in knowledge and negotiat-
ing power between industrialized and developing countries).
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vironmental justice activists as they cannot unilaterally exempt them-
selves from the applicability of federal environmental regulations.
The recurrent failure of ordinary political processes to provide
adequate relief for grievances raising discrimination, distributional
equity, and fairness issues, however, has been well understood by the
law. Various sources of recourse exist under both statutory and consti-
tutional law.69 The larger question that this raises is why existing do-
mestic remedies to claims of discrimination and distributional inequi-
ties have been inadequate.
B. The Obstacles to EnvironmentalJustice
1. The Failure of the Existing Law for Environmental Justice
In the past, the courts frequently were venues of last resort for
environmentalists and civil rights activists alike. When political and
regulatory processes failed them, courts often lent a sympathetic ear.
But that has largely not been the case for environmental justice plain-
tiffs. 70
For example, simple application of traditional civil rights tools,
such as equal protection claims, have met with very limited success
when raised in environmental discrimination suits. 71 The primary rea-
son for this failure has been located in the discriminatory intent re-
quirement and the formidable obstacles it presents to succeeding in
many civil rights claims. 72
69 The wealth of civil rights remedies range from the Constitution's Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses to various civil rights statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The field is much too broad for a quick review here. For a general overview, see THEODORE
EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (1996).
70 A partial explanation may be an increasingly politically conservative judiciary.
71 See, e.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding that
plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to meet standard of intentional discrimina-
tion); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm., 706 F. Supp. 880, 887 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (finding in favor of defendants that loca-
tion of landfill was not improperly motivated by race); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt.
Corp. 482 F. Supp. 673, 681 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying
motion for preliminary injunction based on statistical evidence presented; plaintiffs failed
to establish substantial likelihood of success on the merits).
72 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling,
21 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 523, 538-41(1994); Leslie A. Coleman, It's the Thought That Counts:
The Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 447 (1993) (argu-
ing that proof of discriminatory intent should not be the sine qua non of an equal protec-
tion challenge to environmental racism); Rachel Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism,
90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 409-11, 420-22 (1991).
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In environmental litigation, the difficulties that this requirement
presents are readily apparent. A myriad of factors are important in
environmental decision-making, ranging from scientific/technical
considerations to economic ones. 73 Because none alone is dispositive,
it is easy to hide discrimination behind a host of technical informa-
tion. But even more importantly, the discriminatory intent require-
ment is premised on the existence of a particular, identifiable bigoted
actor or a bigoted act that can be blamed for the discriminatory re-
sult.74 The requirement purposefully ignores the fact that discrimina-
tory outcomes are frequently the result of processes that cannot be
traced to any specific actor or act, but are instead the result of institu-
tions and processes that are biased against racial minorities. 75 Such
discriminatory biases are naturally submerged by complex regulatory
processes.
Administrative agency regulations under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, extending the prohibition of discrimination by recipients
of federal assistance to discriminatory impacts, represent an impor-
tant exception to the discriminatory intent requirement.76 Yet, even
though the promise of such approaches is great, as discussed below,
current implementation efforts by EPA raise troubling questions as to
the efficacy of such administrative processes. 77
Creative tailoring of traditional environmental legal claims to the
needs and particular circumstances of environmental justice commu-
nities has met with somewhat greater success. 78 Their overall effec-
tiveness for the movement, however, has been less than clear.79 For
73 Godsil, supra note 72, at 398-401; Collin, supra note 63, at 125-26; see generally Rob-
ert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of EnvironmentalJustice, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,681 (2000).
74 See, e.g., Ian Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (pointing to factors other than purposeful
action as causes for discrimination). But see Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the
Equal Protection Mill 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 387, 390 (1999) (arguing that environmental laws
can help provide evidence of discriminatory intent).
75 See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 74 (suggesting the importance of institutional processes);
Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987) (stating that racism is in large part a product of the uncon-
scious).
76 Bradford Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 34, at 23-24, 31.
77 See infra Part I.C.
78 See Cole, supra note 72, at 525, 529-30 (discussing a four-tier litigation strategy based
on traditional environmental law claims, unusual environmental law claims, statutory civil
rights claims, and constitutional civil rights claims).
79 Some scholars have emphasized the effectiveness of non-legal or state law strategies.
See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City: Lessons for the Movement, 5 MD. J. CON-
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example, even though environmental citizen-suits have allowed pri-
vate individuals to bring enforcement actions against polluters or
against the federal government itself, they have been inadequate for
environmental justice communities.80 Citizen-suit provisions do not
provide for private damages and thus create no fund out of which liti-
gation costs may be paid by poor plaintiffs.8' Attorney fees may be
awarded if the suit is successful.8 2 As has been pointed out by Eileen
Gauna, however, both the delay in the payment of such fees, as well as
the inherent litigation risk, significantly reduces the incentives that
such fee-shifting provisions provide to attorneys to take on environ-
mental justice claims.8 3
Provisions requiring compliance with particular decision-making
processes, including public participation, have also been identified as
potentially useful for environmental justice activists because they pro-
vide important opportunities for judicial intervention.84 Because such
requirements are typically part of most permitting processes, they
hold the promise of meeting widespread complaints that environ-
mental decision-making processes fail to consider local community
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 67, 77-80 (1994) (arguing that legal approaches are the least favored
approaches to solving environmental problems; in the alternative, political struggles are
necessary). Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination,
41 U. KAN. L. REV. 271, 300 (1992) (arguing that state law offers a wider range of possibili-
ties for dealing with environmental race discrimination than does federal law); Naikang
Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory
Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366, 379-80 (1992) (advocating that litigants
explore state statutory, common law, and constitutional litigation strategies as alternatives
to federal law claims).
80 See generally Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incen-
tives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 42-45, 86-87 (1995) (arguing
that enhanced access to courts may help to correct environmental inequities).
81 See id. at 43 (suggesting that lack of financial resources may defer citizen enforcers).
82 Id. at 76-78.
83 See id. at 76-79. Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Buckhannon Board
& Care Home v. West Virginia casts further doubt on the ability of environmental citizen
plaintiffs to recover attorney fees. 532 U.S. 598, 860 (2001). There, the Court found that
the plaintiffs did not prevail in the law suit, and thus could not qualify for attorney fees
even though the suit brought about voluntary change in defendant's conduct. Id. Buck-
hannon does not conclusively answer whether a defendant may avoid attorney fees claims if
defendant complies with plaintiffs' demands prior to adjudication of the claim. Id. at 865-
66.
8 See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Public Participation, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, Supra note 34, at 185,
185-201, 206-09 [hereinafter Foster, Public Participation]; Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters:
The Quest forEnvironmentalJustice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 749-52 (1993) [hereinafter Fos-
ter, Race(ial) Matters]; Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environ-
mental Laws and "Justice, "47 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 251-52 (1995).
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concerns adequately.85 Increased participation of local communities
should theoretically address such concerns and arguably result in a
final decision that takes better account of such interests.8 6 The failing
of such processes, however, is that they do not require specific sub-
stantive outcomes that courts can enforce. Procedural requirements,
while capable of influencing the outcome, can rarely prevent substan-
tively adverse regulatory decisions.
Finally, environmental provisions that require gathering or dis-
closure of information, such as the Toxic Release Inventory87 or the
National Environmental Policy Act,88 have proven useful to environ-
mentalists in responding to regulatory violations or in identifying
more general problems of pollution at a facility.89 Such provisions can
also be useful by providing evidence supportive of discrimination
claims. 90 In the end, however, merely facilitating the assembly of proof
of environmental injustice cannot change the underlying substantive
legal requirements necessary for making out a claim.91 Substantive
standards, such as the difficult-to-prove discriminatory intent re-
quirement of most civil rights claims, inherently disfavor environ-
mental justice activists.
2. The Meaning of Environmental Justice
Apart from pointing to the inadequacy of environmental and civil
rights law for the vindication of environmental justice complaints,
there have also been less sympathetic views of why the movement has
found it so difficult to succeed in substantively changing how regula-
tors address environmental justice issues. These views suggest that en-
vironmental justice is about "political opportunism," jobs, or narrow
disputes about discrimination in waste facility siting.92 At their base,
SSee, e.g., Foster, Public Participation, supra note 84, at 185-201, 206-09; Foster,
Race(ial) Matters, supra note 84, at 749-52; Kaswan, supra note 84, at 251-52.
86 See, e.g., Foster, Public Participation, supra note 84, at 185-201, 206-09; Foster,
Race(ial) Matters, supra note 84, at 749-52; Kaswan, supra note 84, at 251-52.
87 Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know-Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11,001, 11,044(a) (2000) (requiring information be made available to the public).
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (2000) (requiring that environmental impact statements
and comments be made available to the public).
89 Id. §§ 4321, 11,001, 11,044(a).
90 See Kaswan, supra note 84, at 286-89 (suggesting that some environmental laws es-
tablish substantive criteria such that violation may signal a possibly discriminatory deci-
sion).
91 See Reich, supra note 79, at 297-98.
" See, e.g., FOREMAN, supra note 40, at 124; Michael S. Greve, EnvironmentalJustice orPo-
litical Opportunism, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 475, 479 (1994); J.B. Ruhl, The Co-
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such criticisms of the movement assert that it lacks real substantive
content.
Of course, environmental justice activists would disagree. While
in its early stages environmental justice was understood as a term syn-
onymous with "environmental racism," suggesting its primary focus
on race discrimination issues, 95 it has become clear that its focus is
much broader than that. Since then it has reached out to poor Cauca-
sian communities and others concerned with environmental degrada-
tion. In many respects it is as much a social justice movement focused
on environmental matters as the civil rights movement was with re-
spect to the racial subordination of African-Americans. Its concerns
have included socio-economic disparities, the exclusion of minorities
and the poor from decision-making processes, and the current effects
of past discrimination and other past wrongs.94 Implicit is a more
general interest in ensuring an environment that promotes the eco-
nomic health and quality of life needs and desires of racial minorities
and the poor.95
These conflicting views should not be surprising. They spring
from disagreements about what the environmental justice movement
stands for and what its goals are. After all, "justice" is a term that is
Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition,
Then Conflict, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. F. 161, 185 (1999) ("Environmental justice uses
equity as the theme for a narrow, single-minded focus on eliminating disproportionate
impacts of environmental degradation on racial minorities at site-specific levels."). Equally
critical assertions have been that environmental justice is more about jobs, lack of political
power, and tax trade offs than racial discrimination. David Schoenbrod, Environmental
'Injustice'Is About Politics, Not Racism, WALL ST.J., Feb. 23, 1994, at A21.
93 Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM:
VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 39, at 3. According to then-Reverend Benjamin
Chavis:
Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental policymaking
... in the enforcement of regulations and laws ... in the deliberate targeting
of communities of color for toxic waste facilities.., in the official sanctioning
of the life-threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in communities of
color... [and] in the history excluding people of color from the mainstream
environmental groups, decision-making boards, commissions, and regulatory
bodies.
Id.
94 See generally Kuehn, supra note 73 (elaborating on corrective, distributional, proce-
dural, and social justice aspects of environmental movement's goals).
95 In this respect, the environmental justice movement is concerned, as is critical race
theory, with discriminatory structures and institutions. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Introduc-
tion, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, at xiii, xiii-xv (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995); Cornel West, Foreword, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xi, xi-xii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw ed., 1995).
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used in a variety of contexts, ranging from notions of procedural jus-
tice to substantive ones, which has different meanings to different
people. The concept of environmental justice is no different.96
Still, there are limits to an appropriate understanding of the con-
cept of environmental justice. Because it is a term that has described
the goals of environmental justice activists, attempting to study an ab-
stract meaning runs the risk of changing the concept into one di-
vorced from what these activists intended it to capture and what they
hoped to achieve. It should be apparent that a conception of "envi-
ronmental justice" that is different from that of the movement will be
significantly less useful, or of no use, in understanding the difficulties
of integrating the movement's concerns into the existing environ-
mental regulatory framework.
But there has been an aspect of the criticisms of the social justice
understanding of environmental justice that is more difficult to ad-
dress. Seeing environmental justice as a symptom of a larger struggle
about political disenfranchisement has led activists to pursue a broad
strategy of seeking political empowerment and increased participa-
tion by the poor and racial minorities in environmental decisions. 97
This strategy's clarity and simplicity has provided the movement with
a powerful organizing tool and appears to have been responsible for
much of its successes to date. Yet, the simplicity of this process-based
focus arguably has provided little guidance to industry and regulators
interested in acting responsibly with regard to environmental justice
issues and concerned with usable substantive decision-making criteria.
Unsympathetic criticisms in this regard have focused on the per-
ception that environmental justice is an amorphous concept with no
clear substantive contours and no clear regulatory goals.98 Most gen-
9 Differences and disagreement about the content and scope of the concept have
been typical of efforts to define and gain a better understanding of environmental justice.
See generally Andrew Dobson, JUSTICE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONCEPTIONS OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 5-7 (1998); Been, supra
note 35; Kuehn, supra note 73, at 10,683-84; Ruhl, supra note 92, at 185.
97 See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Envi-
ronmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 639-41 (1992) (suggesting that grassroots
activists are willing to explore a wider range of strategies than mainstream environmental-
ists); Sheila Foster, Justiceftom the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and
the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 808-09
(1998) (advocating that grassroots struggles are a crucial arena for restructuring social
relations in systems of localized government decision-making).
9 FOREMAN, supra note 40, at 123. Foreman asserts that "[e] nvironmental justice can-
not yet be described as a clear, durable and primary goal for any national agency or
significant interest group." Id. at 122.
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erally stated, the argument asserts that, the failure to articulate the
contours of environmental justice clearly and specifically is a fatal de-
fect that destroys any basis for reasoned government action by regula-
tors.99 Some critics have maintained that the environmental justice
movement has only been able to maintain public support for its goals
by dealing in vague generalities, buzz words, and slogans1°°-that the
movement is nothing but rhetorical flair. If forced to articulate more
specifics than mere platitudes, ambiguities, and abstract concepts, the
movement would simply collapse under its own contradictions and
internal inconsistencies.10 1 In the eyes of these critics, the movement
has contributed little to advancing solutions, and may arguably be an
impediment to real progress on environmental protection issues for
people of color.102
While there may be some truth to some of these concerns, such
criticisms prove too much. After all, the faults that such critiques find
with the movement also apply to the idea of racial and class justice
more generally. Such arguments in essence deny that the civil rights
movement and other social justice movements have accomplished
significant social change. They ignore the successes of such move-
ments in furthering the ideals of justice. The critics posit, in the end,
that our present conceptions of justice are imperfect and that the
make-shift tools used to pursue them have undesirable side-effects.
That is, of course, a characteristic of ongoing philosophical and legal
discourse about the meaning of social justice and its translation into
concrete public policy measures.
Perfection and logical consistency remain in the realm of
mathematics and other spheres of logical thought, but are unlikely to
be achieved in the messy world of real life that the law is designed to
handle. 03 In that sense, attempts to engage in exercises of logic with
99 See id. at 3, 122-26.
100 See, e.g., Greve, supra note 92, at 479 (suggesting that while environmental justice
may be powerful at the rhetorical level, it loses power at the practical level).
101 See generally FOREMAN, supra note 40, at 124. According to Christopher Foreman,
"[b]eyond the conviction that rigorous democratic practice and accountability are essen-
tial to ajust outcome," the movement "really specifies no answer to the question of what is
best for a given community." Id.
102 Id. at 117 (arguing that environmental justice can deflect attention from serious
hazards to less serious or perhaps trivial ones). In fact, one critic has stated that "[c]learly,
no serious advances can be made in the attempt to pursue environmental equity until a
conception of equitable distribution is crystallized." Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism
Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 80 (1996).
103 Cf OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience.").
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 29 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L Rev. 161 2001-2002
Environmental Affairs
regard to environmental justice and its implementation in the law, in
the vein of nineteenth century Langdellian legal views, 1°4 demand a
degree of articulation, consistency, and perfection of the movement
that is not present in any other area of law and public policy. To ac-
cept environmental justice as an evolving concept means that any
evaluation of it must consider that the imperfections of existing juris-
prudential and philosophical frameworks also limit the full articula-
tion of the movement's ideas. In determining the movement's success
in accomplishing its goals, we must take into account real-world con-
straints. 105
Yet, even given such limitations, it is possible to provide a more
specific articulation of the substantive concerns of the environmental
justice movement as they relate to environmental regulation. As dis-
cussed below, such an understanding focuses on the market failure
parallels between discrimination and environmental degradation and
the rationality of discriminatory actions.
C. EPA's Title VI Guidance
As a remedy to the inadequacies of the existing civil rights and
environmental laws in addressing environmental justice concerns, ac-
tivists have looked to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.106 Title VI
prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance.10 7
While the Supreme Court has held that Title VI itself only directly
reaches constitutionally prohibited, intentional forms of discrimina-
tion, it has also acknowledged that Title VI allows federal agencies to
promulgate implementing regulations that prohibit actions with un-
justifiably disparate impacts. 0 8
104 See generally Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 196 (1995) (dis-
cussing Christopher Langdell's contributions to the conception of and approach to law).
105 This is not to imply that activists have a proprietary interest in the meaning and the
goals of environmental justice or that there is necessarily unanimous agreement among all
activists on the meaning and goals of the movement-it is an ideal that belongs to all. Nor
does it mean that one cannot examine the movement critically. Yet, unless we believe that
environmental justice is a sham issue-that is, it is just window-dressing for self-interested
actions-we must first understand and accept environmental justice under the movement's
own terms in order to critique it in a meaningful fashion. To determine what it has con-
tributed to our understanding about the role of race and class in environmental regula-
tion, we must take the beliefs and goals of environmental justice advocates seriously.
106 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2000).
107 Id.
108 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985) (defining the Court's earlier
two-pronged holding on the nature of the discrimination proscribed by Title VI as ex-
pressed in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584, 607-08 (1983)).
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The vast majority of states and local governments receive some
form of federal financial assistance from EPA for their environmental
programs and are, accordingly, subject to the mandates of Title VI.
Because EPA's Tide VI implementing regulations' 9 incorporate the
disparate impact standard, they were originally expected to make it
significantly easier for environmental justice activists to vindicate their
claims.110 Moreover, as a more informal administrative process, this
mechanism was thought to be able to provide substantial assistance in
investigating and gathering proof."' The reality has not borne out
such hopes.11 2
109 EPA's Title VI regulations, which require non-discrimination in programs receiving
federal assistance from the EPA, provide in part:
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with
respect to individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex .... A
recipient shall not choose a site or location of a facility that has the purpose
or effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits of, or sub-
jecting them to discrimination under any program to which this part applies
on the grounds of race, color, or national origin or sex; or with the purpose
or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
objectives of this subpart.
40 C.F.R. §§ 7.35(b) & (c) (2001). These regulations have become especially important in
the environmental regulatory context because many state and local environmental pro-
grams receive financial assistance from EPA and thus are subject to the discriminatory
impact standard. See Steven Light & Kathryn Rand, Is Title VIa Magic Bullet?: Environmental
Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 1, 26
(1996).
110 See, e.g., James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 180-85 (1994).
III See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: The Brief History
of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J. ENV'rL. L. &
LITIG. 309, 320 (1994).
112 In fact, EPA has been excoriated for its glacial pace in processing such complaints
as well as the single substantive decision it has issued. , Id. at 392-96. See generally Luke W.
Cole, "Wrong on The Facts, Wrong on The Law". Civil Rights Advocates Excoriate EPA's Most Re-
cent Title VI Misstep, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,775 (1999); Colopy, supra note 110. Since the be-
ginning of the Clinton Administration, 124 such complaints have been filed. U.S. EPA,
Office of Civil Rights, Status Summary Table of EPA Title VI Administrative Complaints,
Jan. 4, 2002, at http://www epa.gov/ocrpagel/docs/t6stjun2000.pdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2002). Sixty-seven of them have been rejected on technical procedural grounds. Id. Only
one complaint has been evaluated on the merits-the complainants lost. Id. Forty-six of the
complaints continue to await resolution. Id. Yet, even these modest and tentative steps have
been criticized strongly by business interests and state and local governments as simply
unwarranted. See, e.g,, Cindy Skrzycki, Up Against the Environmental Justice System, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at F1.
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EPA originally issued its Title VI implementing regulations in
1973 and revised them in 1984.113 Beginning in the early 1990s, envi-
ronmental justice groups began to press EPA to make more effective
use of its Tide VI regulations. n 4 EPA, however, did not react substan-
tively to these calls until 1998.115 Then, in order to facilitate its han-
dling of administrative Tide VI complaints, EPA issued an Interim
Guidance setting out a number of procedural and substantive re-
quirements governing its investigations of discriminatory impact
complaints." 6 At its core, it created a five-step process by which dispa-
rate impact allegations were to be analyzed." 7 Yet, with all the delay
and expectations, only one administrative Tide VI complaint was de-
cided on the merits-with an outcome adverse to the complainants." 8
On June 27, 2000, EPA issued draft guidance documents to clar-
ify for agencies and citizens the compliance requirements of Tide VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.119 Set out in two parts, the first directs
itself to recipients of EPA financial assistance. 12 0 This "Draft Recipient
Guidance" seeks to aid federal fund recipients to avoid Title VI com-
plaints through "a framework designed to improve ... existing pro-
grams or activities and reduce the likelihood or necessity for persons
to file Tide VI administrative complaints." 1 1 Its recommendations to
recipients include measures regarding staff training, public participa-
tion and outreach, disparate impact analyses, intergovernmental in-
11 See40 C.F.R. §§ 7, 12 (2001).
114 SeeCole, supra note 111, at 392-97.
115 See generally Cole, supra note 112, at 10,775.
116 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING Ti-
TLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (Feb. 5, 1998), at http://
www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/interim.pdf (last visitedJan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter INTERIM
GUIDANCE].
117 These steps include: (1) identification of the affected population; (2) determining
the demographics of the affected population; (3) determining the universe(s) of facilities
and total affected population(s); (4) conducting the disparate impact analysis; and (5)
determining the significance of the disparity. &e INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 116.
118 Letter from Ann E. Goode, U.S. EPA, Office of Civil Rights, to Father Phil Schmit-
ter, Sister Joanne Chiaverini, St. Francis Prayer Center, and Russell J. Harding, Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality, re: EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint)
(Oct. 30, 1998) (on file with author), available at http://www.epa.gov/region5/steelcvr.
htm (last visitedJan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Select Steel Complaint Letter].
119 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,650.
120 See id. at 39,655.
121 I
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volvement, alternative dispute resolution, mitigation measures, and
internal evaluations of Title VI activities. 122
The second part, the "Draft Revised Investigation Guidance," de-
scribes and elaborates upon the investigative process EPA is to follow
in pursuing complaints alleging disparate impacts from the issuance
of a permit by a federal fund recipient. 2 3 The Draft Revised Investiga-
tion Guidance includes a detailed procedural time-line setting out
deadlines and other timeliness requirements for filing a complaint, 124
intermediate decisions on acceptance or rejection of complaints, pre-
liminary findings of non-compliance, voluntary compliance opportu-
nities by the recipient, and appeals. 125 In addition, it also sets out vari-
ous substantive criteria and guidelines it plans to use in reviewing the
merits of disparate impact complaints. 26 At its heart is the adverse
disparate impacts analysis, which is used to decide whether the envi-
ronmental permit at issue creates an adverse disparate impact cogni-
zable under its Title VI regulations and warrants further administra-
tive action. 127
This analytical framework consists of a six-step process that re-
tains all of the elements elaborated upon in the Interim Guidance: 128
(1) An assessment of the applicability of the Title VI regulations; (2) a
determination of the appropriate scope of the investigation; (3) an
evaluation of the actual impacts; (4) a determination of whether the
impact is in fact adverse; (5) a demographic characterization of the
affected population; and (6) a decision on whether the adverse dispa-
rate impact is sufficiently significant 29
12 See id. at 39,656-64.
123 See id. at 39,668-69.
124 Under the Draft Revised Guidance, complaints must be filed within 180 days of the
triggering discriminatory act, such as the issuance of a permit having discriminatory im-
pacts. Id. at 39,672. During the pendency of a Title VI complaint, however, a contested
permit remains in effect. Id. at 39,676.
125 All throughout the complaint process, EPA also encourages the informal settlement
of complaints, including through alternative dispute resolution processes. Draft Title VI
Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at 39,673.
12 Id. at 39,676-82.
127 Id.
128 The Draft Revised Guidance expands a five-step disparate impact analysis to a six-
step process by including and expanding on one criterion that was previously already part
of the INTasiM GUIDANCE generally, but not as a specific impact analysis step. Compare IN-
TERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 116, at 7, with Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investiga-
tion Guidance, supra note 17, at 39,677.
12 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,676-77.
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The Draft Revised Guidance's first step seeks to limit the set of
applicable permit actions where EPA will pursue the substantive alle-
gations of the complaint."l 0 For instance, EPA is likely to find its Title
VI regulations inapplicable to permit actions that do not involve is-
sues related to stressors identified in the complaint, such as changes
of name or mailing addresses."'1 EPA is also unlikely to act on com-
plaints involving permits covered by area-specific agreements already
determined by EPA to satisfy Title VI requirements, which lead to
significant decreases of overall pollution emissions, or that involve
permit actions that in fact significantly reduce the pollutants of con-
cern to the complainant, are unlikely to pass this hurdle in the analy-
sis.132
The second step defines the scope of the investigation by focus-
ing on which stressors, sources of stressors, and/or impacts have been
appropriately raised by the complaint as implicating EPA's Title VI
regulations.5s
The third step then seeks to establish a causal link or association
between the alleged discriminatory act and the alleged discriminatory
impacts.134 Such a determination is to include an inquiry into plausi-
ble mechanisms and exposure routes between the impacts and the
source of stressors as well as attempts to quantify such potential im-
pacts. 135 In doing so, EPA expects to examine the various causal links
to the impacts, the risks that various exposures and stressors create,
and the toxicity and concentration levels of particular stressors.13 6
The fourth step of EPA's Draft Investigation Guidance calls for an
assessment of whether the impacts are in fact adverse as an environ-
mental or human health matter.1 s7 Such a determination is made by
13o Id. at 39,677.
131 According to the Draft Revised Guidance, stressors are "[g]enerally, any substance
introduced into the environment that adversely affects the health of humans, animals, or
ecosystems." Id.
132 Id. at 39,675-76. In area-specific agreements, recipients enter into agreements with
affected residents and local stakeholders to proactively address pollution burdens in geo-
graphic areas where adverse disparate impacts may already exist. Id. But for EPA to extend
deference to such agreements, such that they will affect its investigation of the complaint,
the area-specific agreement must be supported by adequate Title VI analyses and be ex-
pected to result, within a reasonable time, in actual reductions or the elimination of Title
VI cognizable impacts. See id.
1s3 Id. at 39,677-79.
13 Id. at 39,679-80.
135 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,679.
136 Id at 39,679-80.
137 Id. at 39,680-81.
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reference to various benchmark values provided by statutes, EPA regu-
lations, or EPA policy.138 In general, exposures must exceed an estab-
lished human health or environmental threshold value in order to
satisfy this criterion.139 While EPA refers to this determination as an
assessment of whether the impact is significantly adverse, the
significance referred to here is not the same as the statistical or legal
significance raised in step six. 4°
The fifth step calls for the identification and characterization of
the population affected by the permit action in terms of race, color,
and national origin.141 It also requires a determination of whether a
disparity exists between the affected population and appropriate
comparison populations. 142 Because of differing exposure routes,
various affected populations may be identified depending on the par-
ticular impacts raised in the complaint. 43 Assessments that are made
include comparisons between the impacts borne by these demo-
graphic populations and others, the demographic make-up of the af-
fected population, and the average impacts and range of impacts. 44
The sixth and final step examines whether the disparity is legally
significant. 45 While this step appears to focus primarily on statistical
measures of significance, it also evaluates associated demographics
and types of impacts. 46 For example, demographic information that
EPA examines here includes affected population size, overall demo-
graphic composition, and the proportion of the jurisdiction's popula-
tion in the affected population.147 Considerations related to the im-
pacts and stressors themselves include the extent to which adverse
impacts exceed significance thresholds, the severity of impacts, and
the frequency of their occurrence. 148
138 Id.
139 The Guidance is explicit in stating that compliance with national ambient air qual-
ity standards (NAAQS) presumptively satisfies the mandates of Title VI. Id. at 38,680-81.
Likewise, where a permit action "clearly leads to a significant decrease in adverse disparate
impacts," even if other emissions increase, such conditions are considered in the remedial
actions proposed by EPA. Id. at 39,681.
140 See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
141 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,681.
142 Id.
14 Id.
14 Id. 39,681-82.
145 Id. at 39,682.
146 Id.
147 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,682.
148 Id.
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In proceeding through this analysis, EPA is to accord "due
weight" to information submitted by recipients related to the dispa-
rate impact analysis. 149 Such information could provide demographic
information, analyses of environmental impacts, and other related
evidence. 150 In essence, "due weight" constitutes a means by which
EPA extends some deference to the regulatory efforts of state and lo-
cal government recipients similar to the deference EPA extends in
other environmental regulatory programs.151 To ensure the reliability
of the information submitted by states and local government recipi-
ents, however, such deference is conditioned on the relevance of the
evidence, the validity of the methodology, the completeness of the
information, the consistency of the methodology and the findings,
and uncertainties in the input data and results.15 2 In the context of
area-specific agreements, which may show reductions or elimination
of disparate impacts or provide for a plan to do so, this deference
could lead to a closure of EPA's Title VI investigation.15 3
A finding of a significantly adverse disparate impact, however,
does not mean that the complainant has prevailed. 54 Upon such a
finding, recipients have the opportunity to provide rebuttal evi-
dence. 155 If the rebuttal evidence does not change the finding, recipi-
ents may also justify their permit action notwithstanding the adverse
disparate impact.156 Thus, significant adverse disparate impacts may
be permissible if they are "reasonably necessary to meet a goal that is
legitimate, important, and integral to the recipient's institutional mis-
sion."157 This can include interests in economic development arising
out of a permit action "if the benefits are delivered directly to the af-
fected population."158 Yet, if a less discriminatory alternative to the
permit action exists, such an alternative would rebut the justification
itself.159 After all, a less discriminatory alternative that still meets the
149 Id. at 39,675.
150 See id. at 39,674.
151 Se id.
152 Id. at 39,675.
155 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,675.
15 See id. at 39,683-84.
155 Id. at 39,683.
156 Md
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,683. A less discriminatory alternative constitutes an "approach that causes less disparate
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needs addressed by the discriminatory action, such as practical mitiga-
tion measures, would make the challenged action unnecessary.
It is only at this point that EPA's Title VI process moves into the
remedies phase.160 EPA may seek the recipient's acquiescence to the
finding and its voluntary compliance with its proposed remedial
measures.1 61 If voluntary compliance is not possible, however, EPA
may also pursue more coercive measures, such as commencing formal
proceedings "to deny, annul, suspend, or terminate EPA assistance."
162
In such an event, the recipient may seek review and appeal of the de-
cision through EPA's administrative adjudicative process. 63
By providing a detailed framework, the two-part Draft Revised
Guidance, EPA has sought to clarify many ambiguities found in the
Interim Guidance. 64 Yet, in spite of the increased detail, the Draft
Revised Guidance has not resolved many of the uncertainties in how
EPA will address future Title VI complaints. 65 These uncertainties
have left EPA with considerable flexibility and discretion. 166 They also
make it somewhat difficult to predict how helpful the Draft Revised
Guidance will be in facilitating the resolution of Title VI complaints in
a fashion more favorable to environmental justice groups. Neverthe-
less, a critical evaluation, based on the approaches and methodologies
used in the Draft Revised Guidance, is possible and provides impor-
tant insight into its prospects.
II. EPA's TITLE VI GUIDANCE AND THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE
REGULATORY PREMISES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THE FORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Similar to the controversy surrounding EPA's Interim Guidance,
serious criticisms were again raised by the environmental justice
impact than the challenged practice, but is practicable and comparably effective in meet-
ing the needs addressed by the challenged practice." Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 39,684. Under Title VI, EPA may also refer a finding of non-compliance to the
Department ofJustice for judicial enforcement. 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a).
163 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,683-84.
164 Id. at 39,651.
165 See Bradford C. Mank, The Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidances:
Too Much Discretion for EPA and a More Difficult Standard for Complainants?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep.
11,144 (2000).
166 See id.
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community with respect to the Tide VI Draft Revised Guidance. 167
That should not have been surprising. Many of the difficulties that
EPA has faced in addressing environmental justice more generally are
traceable to the different premises about the role of government in-
tervention in solving environmental justice problems-environmental
regulators bringing with them understandings based on the tradi-
tional environmental regulatory system, and environmental justice
activists viewing the issues based on perspectives shaped by civil rights
law.' 68 In the Title VI context, these unresolved differences are espe-
cially pronounced since EPA is explicitly seeking to merge the man-
dates of a civil rights statute into its environmental regulatory frame-
work.169
Viewing the difficulties in this fashion may seem odd for many
since it calls for a comparative examination between environmental
law and civil rights law. After all, the two systems appear to address
fundamentally different subject matters--the management and pres-
ervation of the quality of the human environment as opposed to ra-
cial equality and individual rights. Moreover, when one thinks of civil
rights law in action, one thinks of judicial intervention, which is pri-
marily associated with the ad hoc resolution of particular disputes
among private individuals or entities. Environmental law appears in-
stead to be primarily concerned with the administration of public
programs that affect many or all of the citizenry beyond the immedi-
ate parties to the dispute. 170 Important congressional statutes exist
with regard to civil rights and environmental protection. 171 However,
the interstices of civil rights law are filled primarily by courts through
case-by-case adjudication, rather than by administrative regulation.
The predominance of courts and common law adjudication has thus
167 See, e.g., Letter from Luke Cole, supra note 20; Public Comments on Draft Revised Guid-
ance, supra note 20.
16 See Yang, supra note 24, at 20-22.
169 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, at http://es.epa.
gov/oeca/main/ej/index.html (last visitedJan. 16, 2002).
170 Civil rights law is not devoid of administrative agencies. For instance, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) are important actors in the implementation of anti-discrimination
law. Yet, rather than dominating the legal landscape, as EPA does in environmental law,
administrative agencies play rather minor roles in civil rights law compared to the courts in
shaping the substantive legal rules. See infra note 317 and accompanying text.
171 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7601- 7671q (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9708; Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619; Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-2000h-6.
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characterized much of civil rights law.172 Thus, comparing environ-
mental law to civil rights law might seem like comparing apples to or-
anges.
Some scholars, such as Cass Sunstein, however, have drawn the
parallels with little hesitation. 173 In fact, the environmental protection
system's common law roots in trespass and nuisance doctrines should
give some indication that dismissing the common law as a regulatory
regime would be overly simplistic.174 Thus, judicial adjudication and
the common law have been systems for the creation of public policy
just as administrative agencies and, more generally, the legislature
have been. 175 When congressional legislation sets broad policy objec-
tives and few specific standards and rules, common law adjudication is
more similar to the tasks of administrative agencies: filling in the in-
terstices and ambiguities of congressional statutes.176 Judicial law-
making is then confined within those broad policy and legal man-
dates.
The true distinction between courts and legislatures "is not that
courts interpreting statutes do not 'legislate' at all, but that, in com-
parison with legislative assemblies, [courts] perform their function
within a different institutional framework, by different procedures,
and with a different kind of participation accorded to those who are
affected by their decisions."177 In the end, even though the opera-
tional modes of judicial adjudication and administrative decision-
172 See infta notes 305-321 and accompanying text. Discrimination suits seeking struc-
tural reform of institutions, such as school desegregation litigation, have pushed the courts
outside of their traditional bipolar adjudicative modes. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976); see Peter A. Appel, Intervention
in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 215 (2000). Yet,
such instances remain the exception and are notable precisely because of their exceptional
nature.
173 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 61-64, 67-69 (1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION]. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Using Common Law Principles in Regulatory
Schemes (With a Note on Victimology), 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 651 (1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Using Common Law Principles in Regulatory Schemes].
174 In fact, several scholars have sought to revive interest in the common law as a
means of solving environmental problems. See generally THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, at xi-
24 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).175 HOLMES, supra note 103, at 35-36.
176 See Andrew McFee Thompson, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law:
Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1371 (1996) (stating that com-
mon law "functions as a meaningful supplement to statutory law").
177 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 102 (1968).
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making may be different, their overall function is the same: to serve as
mechanisms for social ordering among people, and between their
government.178
Considered in this light, an examination of the different institu-
tional frameworks can provide much insight into serious problems
raised by EPA's Title VI Draft Revised Guidance and its ability to ad-
dress environmental justice complaints. 179 In particular, it shows how
different premises about minority protection, the significance of in-
commensurable values, and the scope of regulation have created ten-
sions that threaten to undermine the effectiveness of EPA's efforts
with regard to environmental justice.
A. The Primary Beneficiary of Regulation: Protecting Minorities and the
Larger Collective
1. Protecting the Larger Collective from Environmentally Harmful
Individual Actions
One characteristic of environmental law has been its distinctly
majoritarian orientation. 180 In large part, this orientation can be at-
tributed directly to the market failure understanding of environ-
mental degradation. 181 Under Garrett Hardin's explication of the
Tragedy of the Commons, the quintessential concern of environmental
regulation has been with actions by individuals that, while advanta-
geous and beneficial to that particular individual, are harmful to the
178 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 357 (1978)
("[F]undamentally,... adjudication should be viewed as a form of social ordering, as a way
in which the relations of men to one another are governed and regulated [because] ... an
adjudicative determination will normally enter in some degree into the litigants' future
relations and into the future relations of other parties who see themselves as possible liti-
gants before the same tribunal."). See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS 16, 20-21, 66, 98-141 (1949) (stating that an important task of the judiciary
is "the filling of the gaps which are found in every positive law in greater or less measure[,
which] you may call... legislation, if you will"); FULLER, supra note 177, at 84-103.
179 Another important disjunction between the conceptions of environmental justice
advocates and regulators about the role of public participation in regulation has been
discussed elsewhere by Eileen Gauna. See generally Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice
Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998) (arguing
that communities bearing the most environmental risk participate in the administrative
process the least).
180 See Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scalia's
Primer on Property Rights: Advancing New Democratic Traditions &y Defending the Tradition of
Property, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. 161, 209 (2000).
181 See generally Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv.
1393 (1981).
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community as a whole.18 2 Because everybody has access to and use of
the commons, the failure of government to intervene with regulations
results in the overuse and degradation of the commons.183 The regu-
latory consequence has been that environmental law is primarily di-
rected at protecting the collective from the irresponsible or selfish
actions of individuals or small groups.18'
Modern environmental statutes reinforce the majoritarian focus
forcefully through their design. 85 Virtually none provides for recov-
ery of benefits accruing to any individual.18 6 Awards of private dam-
ages are not permitted. 8 7 Even the citizen-suit provisions of the envi-
ronmental statutes follow in this mold.188 They create an important
role for private actors in the environmental regulatory scheme by al-
lowing individuals to step into the enforcement shoes of the govern-
ment.189 As private attorneys general, citizens may in this fashion en-
force the environmental laws against violators, sometimes even against
the government itself.190 Any penalty monies that are paid by a defen-
dant, unlike punitive damages, must be remitted to the Federal
182 Hardin, supra note 57.
183 See id.
184 See generally Yang, supra note 24.
185 See Sagoff, supra note 181, at 1398-99.
186 See id.
187 Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, allows private individuals to seek recovery of costs expended in cleaning up a
hazardous waste site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (B) (2000). Such costs cover only "necessary
costs of response." Id. Personal injury or other private damages are not included. See id.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, is the lone exception in allowing for recovery of property
and other economic damages. See Oil Pollution Act § 1002(b) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2)
(2000). It does not allow for personal injury damages. See id.
188 See, e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484-88 (1996) (holding that
the citizen-suit provision under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. § 6972, does not allow recovery for the costs of cleanup); Gauna, supra note 80, at
39-43 (noting that citizen-suit provisions "grant citizens the ability... to sue on behalf of
the community at large, rather than to vindicate individual rights").
189 See Gauna, supra note 179.
190 See id. It is tempting to compare citizen-suit provisions with private causes of actions
that are found throughout federal statutes, including the civil rights statutes. Yet, such a
comparison would be misleading. While injunctive relief as well as penalties may be ob-
tained against the defendant, the very characteristic of private causes of action in the law,
monetary damages or some other private benefit, is generally not provided for. The lack of
monetary damages may be a source of significant constitutional standing difficulties for
citizen-suit plaintiffs. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "In-
juries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 232 (1992) (arguing that allowing successful
citizen-suit plaintiffs to recover cash bounties would give them a concrete interest and
therefore standing as well).
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Treasury.191 Furthermore, any judicial consent decrees that are en-
tered into in settling citizen-suits are reviewed by the federal govern-
ment to ensure that the decree is in the public interest and not the
result of self-dealing by the litigants.1 92
The underlying majoritarian premise is also apparent in other
important statutory tools that have sought to protect environmental
interests. Thus, approaches to environmental regulation that have
sought to provide for open decision-making and explicit considera-
tion of environmental interests,193 as well as information dissemina-
tion about pollution and toxics,194 rest on the assumption that regula-
tors and polluters will be more responsive to and take better care of
environmental interests if they can be held accountable by political
processes. Utilizing and enhancing political processes, of course,
promotes majoritarian decision-making.1 95
Finally, there have also been institutional aspects that have con-
tributed to this majoritarian focus. 196 Chief among them is the reli-
ance on administrative agencies to address environmental problems
rather than courts.197 The greater prominence of agencies over courts
is a consequence of the general necessities of dealing with modern
social problems as well as the specific technical expertise require-
ments of managing environmental problems. 198 Administrative agen-
cies are able to develop the necessary technical skills and expertise
and, at the same time, integrate many other non-legal considerations,
such as social and economic factors, into their decision-making. 199
191 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 373, 374 (1997). Courts and
EPA have sought to make innovative use of supplemental environmental projects (SEPs),
projects in which the defendant engages in environmentally beneficial activity as a form of
injunctive relief, avoiding penalty payments swallowed up in the black hole of the Federal
Treasury. A quid pro quo reduction of penalties for SEPs is prohibited. See id.
192 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(c) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (3)
(2000) ("No consent judgment shall be entered in an action in which the United States is
not a party prior to 45 days following the receipt of a copy of the proposed consent judg-
ment by the Attorney General and the Administrator.").
193 E.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000).
194 E.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 11044 (2000).
195 See Sagoff, supra note 181, at 1414.
19 6 See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: TheForms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 35 (1979).
197 See id.; see alsoJoshua Yount, The Rule of Lenity and Environmental Crime, 1997 U. CHI.
LEGAL. F. 607, conclusion.
198 See generally Fred Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 Crn.-KINT L. REv. 847, 863--69 (1994). See also RACHEL
CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
199 See generally Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 198, at 863-69.
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And since they are unhampered by the straight-jacket of ad hoc, for-
mal judicial process, they can approach problems with a persistence
and a focus that is necessary to develop rules on a systematic basis. As
a result, the outcomes are best for all of society, rather than just the
litigants. 20 Thus, administrative processes promote the interests of
the entire society rather than particular individuals or small groups.
2. Protecting Racial Minorities from Discrimination and Exclusion by
the Majority
Environmental law's focus on protecting the larger collective is
entirely reversed in civil rights law. Its institutional focus on racial mi-
norities has led it to promote protections of minorities against dis-
crimination, exclusion, and other unfair treatment by the majority. By
its nature, civil rights law is largely counter-majoritarian in charac-
ter.201
Its institutional structure is also supportive of this focus. Civil
rights law has not seen the whole-sale technocratic regulatory trans-
formation that has occurred in environmental regulation. To be sure,
Congress has enacted a series of important federal statutes that have
sought to federalize much of this area of the law.20 2 It has not, how-
ever, engaged in the large-scale delegation of congressional authority
to modern expert agencies as it has in the environmental context.203
Instead, regulation in the civil rights context and the elaboration and
interpretation of statutory rules continues to occur primarily through
case-by-case adjudication by courts-law making and regulation in the
200 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30-40 (1938); SUN-
STEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 173, at 11-73;JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAw SYSTEM 5-7 (4th ed. 1998).
201 SeeUnited States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
202 See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 69.
203 For example, both the EEOC and HUD have responsibility only for oversight and
enforcement against employment discrimination and housing discrimination, respectively.
Furthermore, the EEOC does not have the "authority to promulgate rules or regulations
pursuant to" Title VII. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976). Its scope of
authority, even within the limited realm of employment discrimination law that it does
administer, is thus drastically narrower than that of EPA. Likewise, until the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, HUD did not have the authority to bring general enforcement
actions, nor address housing discrimination complaints through administrative adjudica-
tory actions. While the 1988 Amendments changed that, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988)), HUD's authority
within the housing discrimination laws remains substantially less than that of EPA within
the environmental laws. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TME FAIR HOUS-
ING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 8-24 (1994).
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traditional common law mold.2° 4 Judges, of course, by virtue of their
professional traditions and life tenure in the case of the federal judi-
ciary, have much greater insulation from normal political pressures
than administrative agencies. Given that the purpose of the civil rights
laws is to protect minority groups from majority oppression, counter-
majoritarian institutions, such as the courts, are more appropriate
guardians of minority interests than institutions that are subject to
political control, such as administrative agencies. 205
3. The Tide VI Draft Revised Guidance's Reliance on Majoritarian
Administrative Agency Processes to Protect Racial Minorities
Given these antithetical approaches, it is not surprising that envi-
ronmental justice activists have blamed the operation of environ-
mental laws themselves as the cause of environmental injustice.2 6 To
the extent that environmental decision-making is designed to advance
the interests of the majority, it is natural for the minority to lose out
when its interests come into conflict.207
It should be noted that the problem of minority protections,
while similar, is not the same as the problem of under-representation
of broadly-held, unorganized, and diffuse interests within the admin-
istrative agency processes. 208 As Richard Stewart once described it,
modern administrative agency processes are more responsive to or-
ganized interests, and frequently also biased in favor of regulated in-
terests because of their constant interactions and relationship with
204 At the same time, since the interests protected by civil rights laws have their roots
and origins in the Constitution, the Supreme Court's influence has remained inordinately
great. While its common law approach to case-by-case interpretation and elaboration of
the law arguably governs only constitutional mandates, this approach appears to have
naturally carried over to congressionally granted anti-discrimination rights. See generally
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1982) (arguing that the Burger Court has sough t to fit issues concerning standing, class
actions, and remedial discretion into the notions of traditional lawsuits); Henry P. Mona-
ghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Inter rretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996) (interpreting consti-
tutional law-making as common law); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986) (addressing the requirement of
a culpable party).
205 See generally Yang, supra note 24.
206 See generally id.
207 See BELL, supra note 15, at 158-94 (arguing through fictional account that society
would be willing to trade the interests of racial minorities for the good of society, such as
for a clean environment).
2N Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 -IARv. L. REv.
1669, 1760-90 (1975).
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agency staff.20 9 At its most extreme, capture of an agency by its regu-
lated interests may result.210 The agency becomes more concerned
with protecting the interests of the entities that it is to police and
regulate under its legislative mandate than with protecting the public
interest.211
The difficulties that agency decision-making raises for minority
groups appear to parallel such agency process failures. 2 12 Yet, the par-
allel is misplaced. The premise of under-representation of broadly-
held and diffuse interests is that agency decision-makers do not ade-
quately take such interests into account and thus undervalue the
weight of such interests in their decision-making.213 The administra-
tive process has failed to achieve the correct balancing of interests
that provides the greatest benefit to all; in other words, the agency has
made an error.214
The opposite is actually being asserted by environmental justice
advocates. They have claimed that EPA has done too good a job of
maximizing social utility at the expense of minority interests, interests
that by definition have a lesser weight within such regulatory analysis.
Thus, process safeguards, such as in the spirit of procedural due pro-
cess protection or improved representation of interests, are unlikely
to address such problems significantly.215 Instead, effective remedial
actions will likely require substantive change in environmental deci-
sion-making criteria.2 16
One need not doubt EPA's sincerity with regard to environmental
justice in order to be concerned about such systematic biases. As oth-
ers have pointed out, scientific uncertainty remains in much of EPA's
work, and alternative analytical approaches can easily be used to jus-
tify greatly contrasting regulatory outcomes. 217 Thus, environmental
justice complaints against a project might easily be disposed of
through technical analyses and investigative results skewed in one di-
209 Id. at 1713-15.
210 See id. at 1714.
211 Id. at 1682-88, 1713-15.
212 Id. at 1787-88.
213 Id.
214 Stewart, supra note 208, at 1787-88.
215 See generally Tseming Yang, Balancing Interests and Maximizing Rights in Environmental
Justice, 23 VT. L. REV. 529 (1999).
216 Without substantive change, majoritarian-oriented administrative processes will
simply perpetuate pre-existing inequalities. See Foster, supra note 97, at 826-41.
217 See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 103 (1996); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941 (1999).
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rection or another. That may be especially true if the project involves
a multi-million dollar industrial facility supported by the local con-
gressional representative that is expected to bring much needed tax
revenue, jobs, and economic development to the surrounding com-
munity.
This recognition points to a fundamental problem with regard to
the majoritarian premise of EPA's Title VI Draft Revised Guidance. As
the Guidance states, the administrative process for addressing Title VI
discrimination complaints is purely an exercise of EPA's investigative
and enforcement discretion.218 The Guidance itself is thus only an
official description of how EPA plans to utilize that discretion:
It is important to note that EPA does not represent the com-
plainants, but rather the interests of the Federal govern-
ment, in ensuring nondiscrimination by [federal funding]
recipients. The investigation of Title VI complaints ...
should be viewed as OCR [EPA's Office of Civil Rights] fol-
lowing up on information that alleges EPA funds are being
used inappropriately .... In addition, because the Title VI
administrative process is not an adversarial one between the
complainant and recipient, there are no appeal rights for
the complainant built into EPA's Title VI regulatory proc-
ess.
219
The significant disadvantages of such a scheme for complainants
should be clear. For instance, the lack of a specific and assured role
for complainants within the administrative process once it has com-
menced is remarkable, given that one of the main complaints of envi-
ronmental justice communities has been that they have traditionally
been excluded from environmental decision-making processes.220
Complaining communities may of course provide EPA with informa-
tion and help move the investigation along,221 but there is no recourse
if EPA makes an adverse decision.2 22 In contrast, federal fund recipi-
218 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,672.
219 Id.
2o See id. at 39,671-72.
221 Id.
22 M.
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ents under investigation have the full panoply of administrative ap-
peal and judicial review remedies available.22 3
The troubling preference for majoritarian processes also arises
with respect to EPA's attempts to shunt complaints to informal and
alternative dispute resolution processes. 2 24 While such processes have
been heralded as promoting less costly and speedier settlements of
disputes, they also lack the protections that judicial and formal adju-
dicative proceedings provide a weaker party against the stronger
one. 225 Such informal proceedings perpetuate the unequal bargaining
positions that minority communities and the poor find themselves in,
which lead them to bring Title VI complaints in the first place.226 Util-
izing a process that is plainly subject to political control and political
pressure by industry interests is simply insufficient for interests that
require counter-majoritarian protections.22 7
4. The Role of States in EPA's Title VI Draft Revised Guidance
The majoritarian premises of environmental law also point to the
problematic role of state and local governments within the Title VI
Guidance. Federal environmental statutes have created strong coop-
erative relationships between federal agencies and state and local
governments. Oftentimes referred to as environmental federalism,
223 EPA is not unique as an agency in utilizing this investigative approach to ensure
compliance with Title VI responsibilities. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.101-.112 (2001) (setting out
Department ofJustice regulations under Title VI). Yet, the approach is in many respects a
departure from how EPA deals with administrative appeal rights in other contexts, which
are arguably more appropriate models. For example, environmentalists and private citi-
zens who raise concerns about EPA approval of pollution generating activities, as in the
context of permitting decisions, may appeal if the administrative decision is adverse to
them. See, e.g., 40 C.ER. § 124.19 (2001) ("[A]ny person who filed comments on [a] draft
permit [regarding RCRA, Underground Injection Control (UIC), National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES), or Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) ] or
participated in the public hearing may petition the Environmental Appeals Board to re-
view any condition of the permit decision.").
24 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,673-74.
225 See id.
226 See Letter from Luke W. Cole, supra note 20, and text accompanying notes 18-22;
see also Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR.' Where Have the Critics Gone, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1055,
1058-60 (1996) (stating that Alternative Dispute Resolution perpetuates and amplifies
inherent inequalities in bargaining positions).
227 Prior to the Clinton Administration, EPA simply ignored or avoided addressing the
relevance of social justice and equity concerns in its regulatory work. See DowIE, supra note
53, at 155-57; Gauna, supra note 80, at 18-19 & nn.59-61. For EPA to implement meas-
ures, which have been taken by other agencies many years earlier, is troubling in light of its
poor track record with environmental discrimination issues until recently.
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federal regulations cede significant control over environmental pro-
tection, via cooperative arrangements, to states and local govern-
ments. 228 For example, both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act look to states as the primary entities to set standards, administer,
and enforce specific regulatory programs appropriate to the charac-
teristics of their jurisdictions.229
This close cooperative relationship has historical roots. Tradi-
tionally, regulation of the environment, including pollution and natu-
ral resources, was a matter almost exclusively the subject of state
common law.230 It was only through a gradual evolution of increased
federal intervention, beginning with federal funding and other assis-
tance for state and local government regulatory efforts and culminat-
ing in direct federal regulation, that the modern environmental regu-
latory system arose.
But there are also important functional and practical considera-
tions for continued reliance on state and local governments in ad-
dressing environmental degradation problems. With an enormous
range of activities that contribute to pollution and environmental
regulation, the federal government simply does not have the re-
sources to supervise and take responsibility for all of the regulatory
actions needed to protect the environment. 231 Since many environ-
mental problems have primarily local effects, local and state govern-
ment entities will often have faster and better access to information
about pollution problems than the federal regulators.23 2 Cooperation
with state and local governments in protecting the environment is
simply necessary to achieve an effective system. 233
228 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1161, 1174-75 (1995). Of course, the federal government sets
minimum standards; see also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MicH.
L. REv. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 2341, 2342-43 (1996) (describing "interstate externalities" as a primary
reason for environmental regulation at the federal level).
2 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000);
see also WILLIAM RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 196-210 (2d ed. 1994).
230 See generally TME COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 174. In regard to
natural resources management, the states continue to retain their primary regulatory role,
though the federal government's role has expanded considerably through acts such as the
Endangered Species Act. See 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2001) (setting out Fish and Wildlife Service's
general relationship to the states).
231 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of NationalEnvironmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1199-1201 (1977).
232 See id.
233 See, e.g., id.; see also Richard Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991). Certainly, there are
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The relationship of the federal government to states and local
government with regard to civil rights has been fundamentally differ-
ent. Civil rights law has been based on the premise that the federal
government must be suspicious of state and local government actions
in regard to race.2 34 After all, adoption of the Reconstruction
Amendments to the Constitution and passage of federal civil lights
legislation occurred in response to state-sanctioned or state-mandated
discrimination against racial minorities.23 5
That is not to say that states have been entirely missing from the
implementation and enforcement of federal anti-discrimination
laws.23 6 In fact, states may and frequently do, as in the environmental
context, provide greater protections under their own legislative
authority.23 7 It seems hardly appropriate, however, for the federal gov-
ernment to vest trust in entities that it is also obligated to strictly po-
lice. The result has been that the cooperative scheme, such as "dele-
gation" of substantive regulatory authority, and the deference that is
accorded to state regulatory actions in the federal environmental
scheme, is largely missing in the federal civil rights scheme.
Increasing historical distance to segregation and other govern-
mentally-sanctioned forms of discrimination does raise the question
whether such distrust is still warranted. Especially in a context where
aspects of environmental protection where federal government agencies may be at an ad-
vantage over state and local governments. Technical expertise or the availability of agency
resources are some of those advantages. At a minimum, however, the capabilities of local
and state governments as well as their responsiveness to citizens means that they have a
legitimate and important role in environmental protection alongside the federal govern-
ment.
234 Built upon this rationale and history, Congress received special powers through
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce its provisions, while limiting the
power of the states to act in race matters. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 255 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It represents our nation's consensus, achieved
after hard experience through our sorry history of race relations, that the Federal Gov-
ernment must be the primary defender of racial minorities against the States, some of
which may be inclined to oppress such minorities."); see also City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (stating the "[tihe Civil War Amendments ...
worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional and state power over
matters of race .... 'They were intended to be ... limitations of the powers of the States
and enlargements of the power of Congress.'") (citations omitted).
235 This reason for intervention is thus quite different from that prompting federal in-
volvement in environmental issues. Rather than being triggered by the inability of states to
overcome their collective action problems, federal involvement in civil rights protections
was necessitated by the complicity and active misdeeds of state governments.
236 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (2000) (identifying the referral process to state and lo-
cal agencies).
237 See, e.g., Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945).
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cooperation by the federal government with state and local entities
has occurred successfully for quite some time, one might ask whether
such cooperation might also occur successfully with regard to civil
rights. However, even conservatives, such as Justice Scalia, have em-
phasized that distrust of states and local governments continues to be
justified not only as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment history, how-
ever, but also as a matter of social reality and governmental theory.
[T] he record shows.., that racial discrimination against any
group finds a more ready expression at the state and local
than at the federal level .... The smaller the society, the
fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests com-
posing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party;
and the smaller the number of individuals composing a ma-
jority, and the smaller the compass within which they are
placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their
plan of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less prob-
able that a majority of the whole will have a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each
other.2 8
It is this tension that underlies the problem of state and local
government participation in the Title VI administrative complaint
process of EPA. State and local governments have sought some
amount of deference or protection from EPA Title VI administrative
complaints if appropriate state environmental justice programs are in
place.2 3 9 While initially indicating that it would not extend any defer-
ence to states as part of its Title VI process,2 4° its Draft Revised Guid-
238 City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82-84 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (citations and
quotations omitted)). This applies not only to discrimination against racial minorities but
also to the burdens that other disenfranchised groups, such as the poor, face more gener-
ally. See, e.g., Robert W. Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race and Waste in Two Virginia Commu-
nities, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra
note 39, at 93; Foster, supra note 97, at 808-09.
239 See EPA Civil Rights Policy Will Not Defer to State Equity Programs, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY
REPORT, Apr. 21, 2000, at 19-20.
240 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY,
REPORT OF THE TITLE VI IMPLEMENTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE: NEXT STEPS FOR EPA,
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ance accords "due weight" to analysis and data provided by states re-
lated to a disparate impact analysis as well as area-specific agreements
that are designed to eliminate or reduce adverse disparate impacts in
those areas.241 That is, of course, problematic if the state and local
government is the target of a Title VI disparate impact claim.
EPA's scope of inquiry with regard to disparate impacts242 is
equally problematic. The Guidance largely limits the scope of consid-
ered impacts and stressors to those that "are within the recipient's
authority to consider, as defined by the applicable laws and regula-
tions."243 This seems to imply that Title VI imposes no independent
anti-discrimination requirements outside of the recipient's legal
authority, a proposition that seems to run counter to most civil rights
law.244
Of course, there is considerable ambiguity as to whether "appli-
cable laws and regulations" only means state laws or also includes
other federal laws, such as Title VI itself.245 The statement is, at best, a
tautology that recipients will have to consider all impacts and stressors
that Title VI requires them to consider-essentially that recipients
must comply with all laws that apply.246 In the overall context of the
Guidance, however, it is difficult to interpret this language as anything
other than EPA's intent to focus on state laws and regulations alone. 247
As such, relying on state law to define the scope of federal civil rights
protection would amount to an abdication of EPA's federal responsi-
bilities under Title VI. After all, such reliance would leave decisions
about what impacts to consider within the discretion and the manipu-
lation of the states. At its worst, it could result in narrowly defined en-
STATE, AND LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS 26-29 (1999), available at http://
www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/t6faca.htm (last visitedJan. 14, 2002); Draft Title VI Recipient and
Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at 39,674-75 nn.105-06 ("Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, EPA is charged with assuring compliance with Title VI and cannot
delegate its responsibility to enforce Title VI to its recipients. Therefore, [EPA] cannot
grant a recipient's request that EPA defer to a recipient's own assessment that it has not
violated Tide VI or EPA's regulations or that EPA rely on an assertion that a Title VI pro-
gram has been followed.").
241 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17 at
39,674-76.
242 See id.
243 Id. at 39,678.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17 at
39,678.
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vironmental decision-making criteria that effectively foreclose any
successful assertion of disparate impact claims. 48
B. The Role of Quantifiable and Intangible Values in Regulation
The inadequate consideration of incommensurables within envi-
ronmental regulation has presented another obstacle to better incor-
poration of environmental justice concerns.
1. Incommensurables in Civil Rights Law
Intangibles and incommensurable values have broadly pervaded
civil rights law. That is in part because of the broad role that courts
have played in this area of the law. Their institutional limitations, in-
cluding limited resources and narrow jurisdiction, have made them
dependent on litigants to bring matters before them and to present
the issues.2 49 As institutions operating in a context of ideals, simplified
facts, and limited issues, their decision-making processes have focused
on principles and the analysis of rights. 250 Naturally, these institutional
limitations have made courts less able to deal with the quantifiable
values and considerations of scientific and technical issues than with
incommensurables. 251 Their competence in rights, principles, and
other incommensurables seems almost useless in an area where em-
pirical study is crucial, and the decisions themselves are practically
judged by the quality of the outcomes as opposed to the quality of the
process. 252 While courts may be empowered to appoint scientific ex-
perts to evaluate technical issues, 25 that is a poor substitute for the
248 Arguably, under such a deferential view of state authority, state law could simply
specify that environmental decisions cannot consider disparate impacts, whether racial or
otherwise. This would of course run directly counter to the broad purposes and reach of
Title VI, and it seems unlikely that states could insulate themselves from the reach of Tide
VI in such a fashion. It also points out, however, how untenable such a view of Title VI is.
See Letter from Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to Carol Browner, Admin-
istrator, EPA 18-25 (Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author), available at http://www.epa.gov/
civilrights/docs/t6com2000 .060.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Letter from
Lawyers' Committee]; see, e.g., Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d 804, 815 (1967) (requiring
active efforts by states to ensure non-discrimination within their programs).
249 See LANDIS, supra note 200, at 38.
250 See generally id. at 30-40.
25 See id. at 30-31.
252 See generally id.
253 See FED. R. EVID. 706.
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institutionalized technical expertise and resources of administrative
agencies.254
Yet, there are also considerations specific to civil rights law itself.
For instance, the blameworthiness that anti-discrimination law assigns
is not dependent on any particular harmful outcome.255 Rather, it is
the act itself that is morally tainted by the discriminatory motive and
that is therefore wrong.256 In contrast, actions that have discrimina-
tory effects, but are not the direct result of discriminatory motives,
generally do not violate anti-discrimination principles. 25 7
That is not to say that quantifiable economic impacts and other
consequences of discrimination are of no consequence for racial mi-
norities. After all, economic, educational, housing, and other oppor-
tunities arguably affect vital and basic interests in survival and shelter,
which discrimination significantly impairs.258 It would be difficult to
argue that these concerns were not also important to civil rights
laws.259 Nevertheless, the primary focus on equality and other incom-
mensurables has pervaded civil rights law at least since Brown v. Board
ofEducation.26°
2. Scientific and Economic Analysis in Environmental Regulation
In contrast, the federal environmental regulatory framework has
relied heavily on quantifiable considerations in agency decision-
making.261 Technical/scientific standards ensure that pollution emis-
sions are limited 262 or that the harmful environmental effects of
254 See supra notes 202-218 and accompanying text.
25 See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
256 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-71; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240-41.
257 Disparate impact provisions, such as those under Title VII and Title VI, have sought
to change such premises. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2000); see also supra notes 114-
123, 203 and accompanying text.
25 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964); id. at
291-93 (Goldberg,J., concurring).
259 See id.
- 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954) ([T]he physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors
may be equal, ... [but s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."); Heart of
Atlanta Mote4 Inc., 379 U.S. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[P]rimary purpose ... [of
civil rights law] is the vindication of human dignity and not mere economics.").
261 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 302(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(d) (2000); Clean Air Act
§§ 108(a) (2), 112(d) (2000), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a) (2), 7412(d) (2000).
262 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 302(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1312(d); Clean Air Act §§ 108(a) (2),
112(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a) (2), 7412(d).
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chemicals such as pesticides stay within acceptable limits. 263 More im-
portantly, scientific and technical analysis have allowed the environ-
mental regulatory system to adapt to changing scientific knowledge
and understanding of the environment as well as to anticipate un-
known risks and harms.264
At the same time, the persuasive influence of market failure ex-
planations for environmental problems and the utilitarian focus on
economic efficiency considerations have compounded the influence
of quantifiable considerations.decision-making 265 These economic
concerns have shaped modern environmental statutes through a di-
versity of regulatory mechanisms, with approaches ranging from the
use of market mechanisms,266 to command-and-control regulations, 267
to environmental quality standards. 268 The result has been that no
particular value can be identified as uniformly pervading environ-
mental regulation other than the importance of compliance and envi-
ronmental improvement itself. The main question is, "How well does
a regulatory approach protect the environment and at what cost?"
Little is vested in either the particular regulation itself or the process
of arriving at the desired goal.269
263 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act §§ 2(bb), 3(c)(5), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136(bb), 136a(c) (5) (2000).
264 See Percival, supra note 228, at 1161. The trend has been toward more comprehen-
sive approaches to environmental protection. See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 229, at 54-58,
59-60; Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environmental
Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 463, 508 (1989); see generallyJ.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Envi-
ronmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REV. 933 (1997). Of course, these regulatory systems designed
to protect the water and the air are not perfect. In fact, a significant amount of pollutants
escapes the current regulatory scheme. For instance, non-point pollution sources, such as
agricultural run-off, are not covered by existing Clean Water Act regulations.
In the natural resource protection context, such imperfect regulation has evidenced
itself through the move toward habitat conservation in protecting endangered species and
other biological resources. See generally U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. & NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK (1996). For a critical re-
view of the government's approach toward habitat conservation, see generally Patrick Par-
enteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinc-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 227 (1998).
20 See, e.g., Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REv.
19, 55-90 (1986).
26 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 309(d), (g) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), (g) (3) (2000) (re-
covering economic benefit of violation); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Title IV, 42
U.S.C. § 7651n (2000).
267 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (technology standard), 1342; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a, 7475.
268 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313; 42 U.S.C. § 7470.
269 See generally Sagoff, supra note 265. There have, of course, been critics arguing that
the environmental regulatory system is not paying enough attention to economic
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In a sense, reliance on science and economics has thus facilitated
environmental protection and regulation not only by making it easier
to prove the need for regulatory action, but also by providing a tool to
limit the necessary remedial action so that it does not impose too
great a burden on industrial development and other economic activi-
ties.
3. The Failing of Technical Approaches for Environmental Justice
Even though the reliance on quantifiable data for decision-
making has improved environmental regulation in many respects, it
has also had a subversive influence. Because quantifiables tend to be
impressive easy to grasp and identify, they overpower and dominate
the unquantifiable aspects of the regulatory decision-making process.
They obscure the role of the unknown and the uncertain,270 as well as
efficiency. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985). Others, however, have criticized environmental policy
as relying too heavily on utilitarian considerations. See, e.g., Sagoff, supra note 181, at 1410-
18.
In contrast, European approaches to environmental degradation have largely been
guided by a Kantian perspective that sees the "solution to pollution [as] moral conduct
(cease pollution) rather than ... as a market failure to be corrected by market pragma-
tism." JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, POLICY
STUDY NUMBER 143, DESIGNING GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY: EFFICIENT MARKETS VERSUS
POLITICAL MARKETS 34 (1997). Commentators have noted the contribution of the envi-
ronmental regulatory process toward the development of domestic civic republican virtue
by promoting the articulation and building of public values. See, e.g., Jonathan Poisner, A
Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Partici-
pation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 55 (1996) (discussing whether NEPA encourages the "deliberative
ideal"); ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confront-
ing Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 733,
734-42 (1996).
270 Especially with regard to scientific considerations, there are always new questions.
We will likely never know all there is to know and be able to quantify things with the exacti-
tude that critics calling for "sound science" would like ideally. See Daubert v. Merrel Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993) ("It would be unreasonable to conclude that the
subject of scientific testimony must be 'known' to a certainty; arguably there are no cer-
tainties in science."). That is, of course, not to deny the importance of scientific inquiry in
addressing environmental problems. But scientific inquiry is an ongoing process that is
never finished. Id.
Reliance on sound science has affected environmental regulatory thinking so much
that the environmentalist's weapon in prompting regulatory action-scientific proof of a
link between a pollutant or some human influence and an environmentally harmful ef-
fect-has been turned into an excuse to delay or avoid governmental intervention when
clear proof of and quantifiable data about environmental or human health harms has not
been found yet. The call for "sound science" has frequently become a means of avoiding
what is currently considered politically unpopular--outright opposition to environmental
regulation because of profit motives. Opposition of the biotechnology industry to regula-
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the importance of those values, such as ethical and distributional con-
siderations, that cannot be measured. 271 The overall outcome is one
that is frequently warped and suspect, but nevertheless possesses the
mantle of precision and objectivity.272
Yet, public policy is shaped as much by public values and ideals as
by quantifiable science and utilitarian considerations. That has been
especially true outside of the environmental context.2 73 Just because
the government might make millions of dollars by euthanizing se-
verely retarded individuals and harvesting their organs for sale to
transplant patients does not make such actions societally or legally
acceptable. The argument is not enhanced by the assertion that this
method would be an economically efficient way to conserve scarce
health care resources for more economically productive citizens
while, at the same time, saving the lives of others. The idealism ex-
pressed in the Supreme Court's anti-discrimination jurisprudence and
insistence on color-blindness provides ample illustration.2 74
This failing has been especially serious for environmental justice
claims.2 75 Industrial plants or waste facilities might bring jobs, tax dol-
lars, and much needed economic revitalization to depressed inner-city
areas.2 76 Given the failure of economic analysis to capture many values
relevant to community residents, it is not at all clear whether in any
tion of genetically engineered plants and foods, and the belittling of concerns about the
potential human health and environmental risks of their widespread use because of a lack
of specific scientific evidence arguably falls within this pattern. See Jack Kemp, Be Not
Afraid, Use Genetics to Feed the World's Hungry; Agriculture: If We Don't Use Science to Farm More
Intelligently, We Put People and Ecosystems at Risk, LA. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at B9; Marian Bur-
ros, Dual Role of Promoting Industry and Informing Puts U.S. Departments in a Bind, CHI. TuB.,
July 5, 2000, at 3; see also PETER HUBER, GALamIo's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 92-106, 148-69, 214-28 (1991).
271 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and 'Fine-tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1328-32 (1985);
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk
Analysis, 92 COLUm. L. REv. 562, 616-33 (1992) (arguing that risk analysis is a poor substi-
tute for necessary moral judgments about the environment).
272 See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1358-68 (1971).
27s See generally HUBER, supra note 270.
274 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-31, 235-39 (1995)
(finding that all racial classifications, even for those created for benign reasons, are subject
to strict scrutiny).
275 See, e.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991).
276 Some commentators have argued that such benefits do in fact accrue to the af-
fected minority community or the poor. See, e.g., Marie A. Kirk & Christine L. Wade, A
Taxing Problem for EnvironmentalJustice The Tax Money from Hazardous Waste Facilities, Where It
Goes, and What It Means, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 202-03, 235-44 (1997).
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individual case such increased financial and economic benefits out-
weigh the increased health risks, odors, noise, traffic, and otherwise
lower quality of life that usually accompany such facilities.277 While
issues of equality, autonomy, and community preservation frequently
do not enter into environmental decision-making, they are neverthe-
less important concerns for environmental justice communities. At-
tempting to put price tags on such values is simply nonsensical; their
inclusion in traditional cost-benefit analysis is not possible in a mean-
ingful fashion.278
This difficulty indicates that EPA's decision to import more quan-
titative analysis, such as risk and exposure assessments, toxicity-
weighting, statistical analysis, pollutant concentrations, and ambient
air quality standards, into its Title VI adverse disparate impact analysis
may not necessarily help Title VI claimants.279 While statistical studies
have been helpful in establishing a link between race and the siting of
waste facilities, 280 statistical evidence has not been a panacea for activ-
ists. 281
277 See RI.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1147 (raising concerns about noise, dust, odor, de-
cline in property values, interference with religious and social activities, increased traffic
and construction activities, and the blighting of a historic church and community).
278 Of course, environmental regulation has resorted to economic and scientific analy-
sis only because, as a methodology for evaluating competing interests, it appears to be
superior to other mechanisms. Its goal has been to allow us to make hard and difficult
decisions in a more systematic and consistent fashion. Further, part of the task of effective
environmental regulation is to continue to search for better ways to incorporate those
factors that are currently not adequately considered in the analytical methodology.
Yet, many intangibles and incommensurables are simply not analyzable in a quantita-
tive analytical framework-attempting to put uncertainty or equality into analytical quanti-
ties is meaningless in the end. The hard reality remains that environmental law has paid
insufficient attention to values and considerations that have been of tremendous impor-
tance in just about every other area of law and public policy-intangible and incommen-
surable considerations that may not have a direct relevance to purely environmental con-
cerns.
279 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,676-82. For example, whether there is a disparate impact for Title VI is determined by
reference to statistical significance of "at least 2 to 3 standard deviations" of the disparity.
Id. at 39,682. Disparity findings are most likely to occur where "significant disparity is
clearly evident in multiple measures of both risk or measure of adverse impact, and demo-
graphic characteristics." Id. But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995
n.3 (1988); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) (refusing
to apply specific standard deviation threshold to judge disparity); 29 C.F.R. 1607.4(D)
(2001) (utilizing the 4/5 standard for disparate employment discrimination).
280 See Kenneth J. Warren, Evidentiary Issues: Proving Intent and Effect and Defining the Af-
fected Community, in THE LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra note 34, at 397, 401-12.
281 See id. at 419-21.
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For example, just as general causation is only one important ele-
ment of a toxic tort claim, 282 statistical analysis is not the end of the
judicial inquiry.283 A statistically significant correlation to race is only
supporting evidence of discrimination. 284 It generally does not in itself
provide conclusive proof that discrimination occurred in any particu-
lar instance.285 As a result, statistical evidence is inadequate to make
an environmental discrimination claim by itself.286
At the same time, statistical evidence can also prove too much.
Even if there are no statistically significant disparities in the siting of
hazardous waste facilities in racial minority and non-minority com-
munities or other allocations of pollution or environmental burdens,
that does not necessarily mean that discriminatory considerations did
not enter into particular decisions.287
More disconcerting, statistical methods of proof provide a decep-
tive sense of definitiveness.288 In such analytical approaches, intangi-
ble and unquantifiable factors, such as aesthetics, odors, and other
quality of life considerations, are "ignored or understated."289 The re-
sult is that "entire problems tend to be reduced to terms that misstate
their underlying structure and ignore the 'global' features that give
them their total character. "29°
EPA's Draft Revised Guidance fully bears out these concerns. 291
There, it states that:
[D]ata may not be readily available for many types of im-
pacts, or where available, may not be relevant to the appro-
priate geographical area. In some situations, the data may be
282 See, e.g., JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL, THE TORTS PROCESS 110-15 (5th ed.
1999).
2 See Warren, supra note 280.
M Id.
285 But seeYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (finding an overwhelming
statistical disparity as sufficient evidence to show discriminatory intent against Chinese
laundry owners).
m In fact, even if disparate impact is shown in a claim under EPA's disparate impact
regulations per Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act, a defendant may still avert liability by pro-
viding a justification for such discriminatory impacts. See Draft Tide VI Recipient and Re-
vised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at 39,683.
287 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate
Siting or Market Dynamics ?, 103YALE L.J. 1383, 1392-1406 (1994).
28
" Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 626 (1973).
2
" Id. at 627.
290 Id. (emphasis omitted).
291 See Draft Tide VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,679.
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insufficient to perform an analysis. [EPA] expects to use
available data in a hierarchical fashion depending on their
completeness and reliability, placing greatest weight on the
most reliable. 2
Much of the data that might help Title VI complainants to prove their
cases of disparate environmental burdens or overall adverse effects,
isunlikely to be easily obtainable or even exist. The resulting reality
will be EPA's primary reliance on quantitative information that it al-
ready possesses.2 3
It is unlikely that a complaint process directed primarily at ana-
lyzing quantifiable factors will adequately and fairly judge the many
intangible concerns, including aesthetic, dignity, and social impacts,
complained of by environmental justice communities. 4 After all, it is
all too easy to think that "[i]f you can't count it, it doesn't exist."2 5
The accustomed dependence of agency staff on hard, quantifiable
evidence and its illusory authoritative power will prevent a deeper
understanding of discrimination and the concerns of environmental
justice.2 6
22 Id. The expectation that EPA will focus on quantifiable considerations is clear in
how EPA views impacts that will rise to a finding of non-compliance with EPA's Title VI
regulations. Unless an impact "is significantly adverse, [it] is not expected" to lead to a
finding of non-compliance. Id. at 39,680. The guidance's glossary also defines "significant"
as an "observed value [that] is sufficiently large and meaningful to warrant some action."
Id. at 39,684-88 app. A. (stating that a statistical significance is "an inference that there is a
low probability that the observed difference in measured or estimated quantities is due to
variability in the measurement technique, rather than due to an actual difference in the
quantities themselves").
293 For example, in the Select Steel decision EPA based its finding of no disparate im-
pact with regard to a state agency's failure to impose continuous emissions monitoring of
dioxin because of the lack of applicable EPA performance specifications. See Select Steel
Complaint Letter, supra note 118; see also Letter from Lawyers' Committee, supra note 248.
294 Tribe, supra note 272.
2 Id. at 1361.
2w Of course, quantitative analysis, especially statistical analysis, has been used in other
discrimination contexts, such as employment. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424,
426, 430 n.6 (1971). See generally ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DIscIuMINA-
TION LAw § 1.13 (3d ed. 2000). Judicial evaluation of incommensurables, however, argua-
bly results in much more careful and deliberate consideration of such concerns than ad-
ministrative agency weighing.
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C. The Limits of Regulation
Finally, failure to resolve the conflicting understandings about
the appropriate limits of regulation have also affected EPA's ability to
address environmental justice issues.
1. The Reach of Environmental Law and Civil Rights Law
Because of the interconnection within the environment and the
pervasiveness of pollution sources throughout society, from personal
trash and auto exhaust to industrial emissions, pollution abatement
and prevention have required comprehensive approaches to envi-
ronmental regulation. 97 The federal environmental statutes, with all
of their imperfections, represent an important step in the implemen-
tation of this approach at a national level.298 Extensions of such efforts
have prompted international programs, such as treaties protecting the
ozone layer,2 and attempts to change public awareness and moral
attitudes about pollution, consumption, and resource conservation.3°°
The administrative regulatory structure of environmental law has re-
inforced this comprehensive approach. 01
In contrast, reliance by civil rights law on judicial adjudication as
the primary means of regulation has emphasized much narrower lim-
27 See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Policy Statement, 54 Fed. Reg. 3845, 3847 (Jan. 26,
1989) ("EPA believes that the development of a comprehensive multi-media pollution
prevention policy offers enormous promise for improvements in human health protection
and environmental quality."); Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849 (Feb. 26,
1991); RODGERS, supra note 229, at 59-60.
M9 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1621 et
seq (2000); see also City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994) (RCRA
instituted "a comprehensive environmental statute that empowers EPA to regulate hazard-
ous wastes from cradle to grave.").
29 See, e.g., RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 68-97 (1998); see also Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988); Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (en-
tered into forceJan. 1, 1989).
O See, e.g., National Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5510 (2000) (es-
tablishing the office of environmental education in EPA and providing for environmental
education grants, training, and education); see also EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001, 11044(a)
(1986) (toxic release inventory); U.S. EPA, Office of Environmental Education, Explorers'
Club, at http://www.epa.gov/kids (last visitedJan. 16, 2002).
01 AsJohn Landis described it, agencies are given "authority ... [and] an assemblage
of rights normally exercisable by government as a whole" in order to fulfill their missions.
LANDIS, supra note 200, at 15. Administrative agency authority is thus usually comprehen-
sively delegated by the legislature. See id.
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its to the exercise of governmental power.30 2 Case-by-case develop-
ment of the law, the counter-majoritarian nature of judicial power, as
well as the reliance on principles and process considerations as the
criteria for decision-making, rather than particular empirical evidence
and outcomes, have created a tendency in the courts to narrowly
confine their interventions. 30 3 Concerns about maintaining the dis-
tinctive role of the courts vis-d-vis the legislature has also led them to
exercise their authority sparingly.3 4
But there have also been limitations that have arisen out of the
substance of civil rights law itself.30 5 Under equal protection doctrine,
most civil rights statutes have been construed to reach only intention-
ally discriminatory actions, thus imposing significant limitations on
the ability of courts to remedy the effects of discrimination. 30 6
Another important limitation has been the focus of much civil
rights law on discrimination connected to government actions or
other aspects of the public sphere.30 7 This distinction is not just an
artifact of the Fourteenth Amendment's state action language.308 It is
also a significant feature of many congressionally enacted anti-
discrimination statutes associated with varied non-governmental, pri-
vate sector functions, such as employment, housing, or private pro-
302 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
303 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 3-4, 3-6, 8-7, 15-3 (3d
ed. 2001).
"4 See CAROZO, supra note 178, at 113-30.
"o See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("Societal dis-
crimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified rem-
edy.").
"6 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding evidence of discrimina-
tory impact insufficient for equal protection violation); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
307 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491-92, 494 (1954) (focusing on public educa-
tion and the notion that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments"). Even when the Court has found the reach of the equal protection
clause to cover private institutions, including private schools, there has been a nexus to
some form of public support, such as financial and other material support from the states.
See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464-66 (1973) (providing free textbooks to racially
discriminating private schools is impermissible); Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556,
566-69 (1973) (providing free use of public recreational facilities by discriminating private
schools is impermissible); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577-97 (1982)
(finding that government's interest in preventing discriminatory practices by organizations
seeking tax-exempt status prevailed over free exercise rights); see also Heart of Atlanta Mo-
tel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 268-69 (1964) (Black,J, concurring) (stating that public
accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000), pro-
hibited discrimination by a motel even though they sought to compel "privately owned
businesses to serve customers whom they did not want to serve").
"8 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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grams receiving federal funds.3°9 The implicit corollary to this focus
has been that discrimination in a private setting is not a major gov-
ernmental concern.310
The reach of civil rights law has also been significantly limited by
the requirement that race-based remedies be permissible only to the
extent that they are directly co-extensive with the proven violation. 11
Within the school desegregation cases, the extent of the legal viola-
s-t See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a (public accommodations), 2000c (public education), 2000d
(federally assisted programs), 2000e (employment), 3604 (housing). The description of
some of these congressional acts, such as public accommodations, public education, or
federally (and thus publicly) assisted programs, indicates clearly that, on their face, the
protections apply only to activities in the public realm. Employment discrimination prohi-
bitions apply to commercial acts that are commonly seen as dealing with the public. Id.
§ 2000e. Even then, they apply only to employers having employees or more. Id.
§ 2000e(b). Housing discrimination prohibitions, even though promulgated under the
authority of the Thirteenth Amendment and thus able to reach private discrimination, do
not apply, as a matter of congressional choice, to a "single-family house sold or rented by
an owner" or "rooms or units in dwellings ... occupied ... by no more than four families
... if the owner ... occupies one of [the] living quarters as his residence." Id. § 3603(b).
However, that exemption is lost if such racially discriminatory housing is commercially
advertised. Id. § 3604(c); see also United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213-15 (4th Cir.
1972).
310 Of course, civil rights law is not exclusively concerned with public forms of dis-
crimination. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23
(1883) (stating that "[u] nder the thirteenth amendment... legislation, so far as necessary
or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be
direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state
legislation or not .... "). But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 188-89 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring) (suggesting that "choices ... that.., are not part of a commercial relation-
ship offered generally or widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual
entering into a personal relationship, certainly were never intended to be restricted by the
19th [C]entury Civil Rights Acts.").
Fundamentally, the public/private distinction in statutory anti-discrimination law sim-
ply respects the limitations that government should observe in reaching into the private
affairs of its citizens. Within civil rights law, it recognizes that there are important values
competing with anti-discrimination and equality for legal validation. The constitutional
provisions that set out protections for free speech, religious free exercise, and other values
make this clear. U.S. CONST. amend. I. For more detailed discussions on the public/private
distinction, see Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Reputation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982), quoting Justice Marshall's concur-
rence in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980), and Morton J.
Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1982). See also
Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982); Symposium, The
State Action Doctrine, 10 CONST. COMM. 309 (1993).
311 For example, in school desegregation, remedies such as busing could only cover
the students within a school district that had engaged in discriminatory actions. Larger
patterns of segregation not directly caused by governmental action, but the result of asso-
ciated "white flight," could not be redressed by the courts regardless of their exacerbating
effects. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 801-02 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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tion became the relevant measure for the courts' remedial author-
ity.312 Antithetical to how environmental regulation approaches its
problems, courts were not permitted to impose comprehensive solu-
tions if doing so would exceed the scope of the proven prior constitu-
tional violations.31 3 The result has been to drastically limit the ability
of courts, and in the end also other parts of government, to redress
the effects of past discrimination and on-going institutional or diffuse
forms of discrimination.3 1
4
The fundamental difficulty with the limited reach of civil rights
law is that it ignores the fact that discrimination, much like environ-
mental degradation, is an aspect of life that is pervasive throughout
society.3 15 It is the result of a web of interrelated public and private
312 Id. at 739-46.
313 See id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (finding
that societal discrimination is insufficient for the government to remedy use of racial
classifications); Swann v. Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (stating that a constitutional
violation is a relevant measure of the courts' remedial authority); Most lawyers would find
this quite unremarkable, especially considering the primacy of adjudication in judicial
decision-making. But that is precisely the heart of why civil rights regulation is so different
from the actions of administrative agencies. See generally Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MIN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and the discrimination cases following having been characterized by a perpetrator
perspective that has imposed important limits on government power to remedy discrimi-
nation); see also Sullivan, supra note 204, at 85-90.
s4 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (stating that the
Court has "never approved extrapolation of discrimination in one jurisdiction from the
experience of another") (citing Milliken, 418 U.S. at 746). There is an astonishing under-
current to this approach that can best be understood by considering what it would ask of
government in other more technical/scientific areas of regulation. For example, applying
such a decision-making approach to environmental regulation would require local gov-
ernments or EPA to conduct experiments to document the applicability of the laws of
physics and chemistry, and to demonstrate the ecological and public health consequences
of pollution for each locale or jurisdiction in which it sought to regulate pollution.
315 Of course, my claim here is not that the federal environmental regulatory system is
a perfectly all-encompassing regulatory scheme whereas civil rights law is unsatisfyingly
piecemeal. As noted previously, the environmental laws are far from perfect. See discussion
supra Part II.B. Various constitutional limitations, such as the Takings Clause, impose addi-
tional external constraints. And the constitutional limitations on anti-discrimination poli-
cies apply to all laws, including environmental protection laws. Yet, the practical impact of
such limitations on environmental regulation has not had nearly the same disabling effect
in restraining government intervention as it has had in the anti-discrimination context.
Compare generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) with Milliken, 418
U.S. 717.
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causes in which private prejudice and private discrimination can be
just as important as discrimination in its public manifestation. 16
For instance, even though federal and state government actions
have actively contributed to racially segregated housing patterns in
the past, 17 the importance of private actions such as "white flight"
cannot be denied. 18 Furthermore, consistently lower property values
in racial minority neighborhoods compared to Caucasian neighbor-
hoods have been attributed to individually discriminatory desires not
to live in racial minority neighborhoods. 19 Such patterns of private
and public contributions to discrimination appear in many other ar-
eas, ranging from government contracting to employment to con-
sumer transactions.3 20 Limiting civil rights protections to the public
sphere thus leaves important sources and manifestations of discrimi-
nation unaddressed3 21
316 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53, 291-93
(1964) (Goldberg,J., concurring).
317 See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 728 n.7 (referencing lower court finding of Federal
Housing Authority and Veterans Administration involvement in creating or maintaining
racially segregated housing pattern); see also id. at 771 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that construction of schools in die heart of residentially segregated areas maximizes school
segregation and perpetuates residential segregation).
318 Id.
319 See, e.g., Been, supra note 287, at 1388-89; DouGLAs S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 114
(1993).
320 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 261 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that minorities face barriers to participation in government contracting
because they do not have access to the pre-existing social relationships that are frequently
crucial in obtaining subcontracts from prime contractors); see also id. at 271 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing various studies documenting continuing race discrimination); City of
Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 531-33 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ian
Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L.
Rxv. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public
Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1577, 1592-96 (1998) (containing data about statis-
tical disparities in private purchases from minority and non-minority businesses).
321 The Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged this state of affairs. The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). In line with the limitations on the reach of govern-
ment action regarding discrimination, however, the Court has held that general "[s]ocietal
discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy" to provide relief for racial minorities. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 276 (1986). In fact, under Justice Scalia's view, "outside the context of school assign-
ment, ... the continuing effects of prior discrimination [cannot] be equated with state
maintenance of a discriminatory system," and thus does not justify government interven-
tion.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 525 (Scalia,J., concurring). But seeJA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
at 538 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The more government bestows its rewards on those per-
sons or businesses that were positioned to thrive during a period of private racial discrimi-
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2. The Limited Reach of EPA's Title VI Draft Revised Guidance
EPA's disparate impact regulations under Title VI were expected
by environmental justice activists to circumvent the problem of the
limited reach of most civil rights law by focusing on discriminatory
effects rather than discriminatory motivations. 322 Applying a compre-
hensive regulatory approach to such issues should ultimately help en-
vironmental justice complainants vindicate their claims.
Yet, in evaluating disparate impact allegations under its Draft Re-
vised Guidance, EPA will focus narrowly only on sources, stressors, 323
and impacts that the fund recipient may consider under its decision-
making authority, presumably state law.324 Even the consideration of
such stressors and impacts will be largely limited to those that are
quantifiable in nature and that can be causally linked or otherwise
directly associated to the discriminatory permit action.32 5
Such a limited approach to discrimination issues may be in keep-
ing with civil rights law doctrines that have sought to limit remedies to
proven violations.3 26 Here, that would arguably be some violation of
state law.327 According to such reasoning, only if the recipient could
have considered certain impacts and stressors under its state law
nation, the tighter the deadhand grip of prior discrimination becomes on the present and
future.").
There are, of course, a number of arguments as to why all forms of racial classification,
whether benign or invidious, are inappropriate. These range from prophylactic concerns
about the potential misuse of such classification to implement notions of prejudice and
stereotype, the desire to strive directly for the long-term ideal of color-blindness, and the
notion that racial classifications, as an abstract matter and regardless of their effects on
particular groups, are evil in and of themselves. Each of these views depends on differing
assumptions about what approaches are most effective in addressing discrimination and
racial inequality and what the Constitution permits. Yet, they all share the characteristic
that they find the continuing burdens of the present effects of past discrimination on ra-
cial minorities acceptable as a price to society, and they ignore the very different uses and
impacts that racial classifications have had on racial minorities. In all of these views, history
and the reality of inequality matter little compared to particular notions of causation and
jurisdiction.
32 See Colopy, supra note 110, at 152-56; Light & Rand, supra note 109, at 5 n.10.
323 EPA defines stressors as factors introduced into the environment that may adversely
affect the health of humans, animals, or ecosystems, such as chemicals, noise, or odors.
Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at 39,686.
324 Id. at 39,678.
32 Id. at 39,379-80.
326 See supra notes 305-27 and accompanying text. Of course, the counter-argument
would be that Title VI imposes anti-discrimination obligations independent of state law.
327 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,678.
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authority could there be a violation, and also a remedy, under EPA's
Title VI regulations. 28
The problem with such an approach is that Title VI is a civil
rights statute that seeks to reach discrimination much more gener-
ally.329 After all, its goal is not only to ensure that racial minorities not
"be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance," however narrow one might construe
the notion of discrimination, but also that they not "be excluded from
participation in [or] be denied the benefits of" such programs. °30 Ti-
tle VI is thus broadly concerned with inequality in the distribution of
benefits of federally funded programs. 31
Even if a fund recipient's authority is broad enough to consider
many concerns relevant to environmental justice activists, EPA's actual
analysis is still likely to prove disappointing. As discussed above, most
of the Guidance relies on quantitative analysis, such as risk and expo-
sure assessments, toxicity-weighting, statistical analysis, pollutant con-
centrations, and ambient air quality standards to determine whether a
disparate impact exists.332 Given EPA's intent to base its analysis mostly
on complete and reliable data,3 33 most impacts and stressors for which
little quantitative information is available would be given little
weight.s34 And since there are no benchmarks for community preser-
vation, stigma, or even equality, considerations such as these will sim-
ply be ignored. 3 5
Finally, and no less significantly, the Draft Revised Guidance seeks
to analyze the discrimination claims by reducing them to their indi-
vidual and discrete components-connecting particular impacts with
particular causative factors so that a technical analysis can then quan-
328 Id.
329 Such reasoning would also misapply the remedies limitations to a wholly unrelated
area of law. More aptly, this approach is a manifestation of its close cooperative partner-
ships with states and the deference that it tends to extend within environmental regulatory
schemes. See supra notes 225-247, and accompanying text.
330 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
331 See also infra notes 441-480 and accompanying text accompanying.
332 See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
s3 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,679.
s3 EPA explicitly admits that the "evaluation would need to take into account consid-
erations such as policies developed for single stressors or sources without explicit consid-
eration of cumulative contributions and uncertainties in estimates. In some cases, the rele-
vant environmental laws may not identify regulatory levels for the risks of the alleged
human health impact or may not address them for Title VI purposes." Id. at 39,680.
335 See generally id. at 39,677-80.
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titatively judge whether there is a disparity or inequality. Doing so
might allow one to add up the individual disparities. Such reduction-
ism, however, will not be able to capture the larger picture of inequal-
ity and discrimination that is made up of individually small and in-
significant instances of unfairness and inequity.336
In the end, the analysis attempts to adopt a traditional model of
common law tort causation within which particular effects can be di-
rectly linked to actors or actions that can then be described as the
cause for these effects. This type of thinking is not surprising given
that it characterizes much of civil rights law.337 But it is also the type of
legal reasoning that has been abandoned by modern environmental
regulation as unworkable in solving the problems of modern society.
Even though regulation of environmental harms was historically
rooted in common law tort doctrines such as negligence, nuisance,
and trespass,338 the failure of the common law in dealing with modern
environmental degradation problems led Congress to enact the mod-
ern environmental regulatory framework.339 But if the common law
system was unsuccessful in solving modern industrial pollution prob-
lems, then it should come as no surprise that the traditional common
law methodologies embodied in the civil rights laws have failed the
environmental justice movement in vindicating its concerns. Envi-
ronmental justice activists' interests in race and equity may be "new"
336 See Been, supra note 287, at 1388-91.
337 It is arguably also an attempt, however disfavorable to environmental justice activ-
ists, to adopt a more traditional civil rights approach.
338 The common law roots can still be found, for instance, in the imminent hazard
provision, section 7003, of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, which "is essentially a codification of
common law public nuisance remedies." S. REP. No. 96-172, pt. 1, at 5 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5019, 5023.
339 For example, the difficulties that toxic tort litigants have faced in linking their al-
leged harms to specific actors, substances, or acts are illustrative of these problems. Proof
of a discrimination claim raises related indeterminacy problems of multiple causation fac-
tors and pre-existing conditions. For instance, in the hazardous waste facility siting context,
environmental justice claimants have had to contend with non-discriminatory justifications
for disparate siting and impacts, such as cost considerations or transportation access avail-
ability as well as the contributing impacts of pre-existing facilities. The toxic tort equivalent
has been the attribution of harms to lifestyle choices or to environmental risks and harms
other than those blamed on defendants at trial. Arguments that minority communities
may not even be exposed to a facility's harmful pollutants are often times equivalent to
arguments in toxic tort suits that a plaintiff has suffered no harm because he or she is
asymptomatic.
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 29 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L Rev. 199 2001-2002
Environmental Affairs
to environmental regulators; however, the obstacles encountered in
the vindication of environmental justice claims are not.34
Thus, EPA's Title VI Guidance leaves regulators with a compart-
mentalized view of the causes and effects of the problem rather than
an understanding that sees them as interconnected in nature and as
manifestations of larger societal problems.341 For instance, the failure
to identify the cause of discrimination with particularity leads to a
finding that there is no redressable discrimination-in effect that
there is no discrimination or inequality at all.3 42
In many respects, this recognition shows why EPA's Title VI Guid-
ance, without even considering its specific content, is unlikely to suc-
ceed. Ultimately, the Guidance sets up a mechanism for EPA to re-
spond to specific complaints of disparate impacts connected to a
specific permit.3 43 Its understanding of the problem is derived
through the lens of the permit criteria and limited by the specific
permit.344 It is an approach that does not easily accommodate larger
contexts of inequities and historical discrimination.3 45 Yet, perni-
340 To the extent that one can analogize the considerations that Steven Shavell has
raised as being relevant to utilizing a harm management over liability approach, they pro-
vide some support for the application of the environmental regulatory model here as well.
See generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13J. LEG. STUD. 357
(1984). Thus, with regard to environmental justice claims, government agencies have a
significant information advantage over any particular claimants, since government agen-
cies have much easier access, and in fact, are provided with information about the distribu-
tion and locations of pollution facilities. Furthermore, once a facility has been permitted
and built, it is unlikely because of sunk costs and reliance interests that an environmental
justice claimant can be made whole or put into the same situation as prior to the facility's
commencement of operations.
341 This understanding thus also rejects comprehensive approaches to redressing dis-
crimination, which can include race-conscious measures such as affirmative action. In-
stead, government efforts must proceed in a piecemeal fashion. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-77 (1986) (rejecting role model rationale for preferring
minority teacher over Caucasian teacher in layoffs); see also id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (identifying reduction of prejudice as a benefit of white students being taught by mi-
nority teacher); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1996); cf. City of Rich-
mond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (identifying as the reason for the
insufficiency of the role model justification in Wygant the failure to provide a sufficiently
close connection to demonstrated past discrimination, rather than denying the benefits of
minority role models to children).
m2 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
m3 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,668-69.
344 See id.
mL' See generally Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euci, in ZONING
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar &Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989) (showing
that cities have zoned low-income communities of color for more intensive land uses);
Arnold, supra note 50.
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ciously, it effectively allows discrimination and inequities to be blamed
on such larger patterns of historical and societal discrimination while
avoiding the tough actions that would need to be taken to solve
them.346
III. FINDING COMMON GROUND: THE SUBSTANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The problem of the pervasiveness of the presence and effects of
discrimination and its contribution to environmental inequities also
suggests how EPA might make more effective use of Tide VI to ad-
dress environmental justice claims. Rather than focusing only on ef-
forts to adjust the form of the regulatory mechanisms, a closer ex-
amination of the substance of the problems that EPA is charged with
addressing would prove fruitful. Such a substantive approach to Tide
VI's role in addressing discrimination has found only limited practical
implementation in modern civil rights law.347 It is uniquely suited for
EPA, however, in light of its role within the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and its pervasive regulatory approaches. 348
A. The Rationality of Environmental Degradation and
Discriminatory Behavior
Considering the regulatory frameworks that govern environ-
mental protection and civil rights provides important insight into how
government officials and others having to work within these systems
have understood these problems. Yet, precisely because of that per-
spective, this analysis also offers an incomplete understanding of the
problems of discrimination and environmental degradation. 349 These
perspectives are shaped as much by the realities of the social problems
they are charged with solving as they are by larger political and legal
ideologies.350 At closer examination, both types of social problems
share important similarities with regard to the rational impulses that
result in discrimination and environmental degradation.3 51
346 Yang, supra note 24, at 24-28.
47 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 758 (1974).
3 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
349 See infta notes 367-374 and accompanying text.
350 See Yang, supra note 24, at 27-28.
351 Here, my use of the term "rational" is not equivalent to economically efficient.
Rather, I use the term in its most general sense as including all actions that are engaged in
because of specific reasons and contrast it to actions that are engaged in for no reason, for
reasons that the actor realizes to be false, or for delusional reasons. For a discussion of the
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1. The Market Failure Basis of Environmental Degradation
Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons understands environ-
mental degradation as a form of market failure-the result of ration-
ally self-interested actions by individuals which ultimately cause harm
to the community as a whole. 352 Because of the importance of rational
behavior in contributing to environmental degradation, the generally
accepted conclusion is that simple education or moral exhortation
about the harm to the general community is insufficient to induce
individuals or companies to change their polluting behavior.353 In the
end, rational self-interest usually prevails. 354
The prisoner's dilemma problem, of which the tragedy of the
commons is one specific instance, demonstrates this easily. In this di-
lemma:
[T]wo prisoners ... are separately interrogated about a
crime. The two were the only witnesses, so if they both refuse
to testify, the worst that can happen to them is a one-year
conviction for illegal possession of firearms. However, a
clever prosecutor approaches each prisoner and offers him a
proposition: "If you confess and testify against your partner,
he'll get life but you'll go free; the only hitch is that if you
both confess, you'll both get a sentence of 6 years for armed
robbery. I should tell you that I'm offering the same deal to
your partner."3 55
Assuming that the game is played only a single time, and assum-
ing further that the prisoners are rational and motivated only by self-
interest, they will both confess-and get six years in jail, rather than
keep quiet and get off with only a year. The paradox, of course, is that
by pursuing their individual self-interest, the prisoners behave in a
various conceptions of rational actions, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAIF.
L. REv. 1051, 1060-66 (2000). For a general critique of economic approaches to law, see
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv.
451 (1974).
s35 Hardin, supra note 57.
M Id. There have also been significant criticisms of the tragedy of the commons un-
derstanding of environmental degradation. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& EcoN. 1 (1960). See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
-' Hardin, supra note 57.
35 5 E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of En-
vironmental Law, 1J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 324 (1985).
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way that is contrary to their shared collective interest in shorter sen-
tences. 356
The prisoner's dilemma has been used to illustrate many varying
points about the obstacles to collective action.357 Here, it illustrates
not only the power of self-interest in defeating any sense of moral ob-
ligation to advance the common good, but also the ability of free-
riders to undermine or even destroy the benefits of communally con-
scious actions.358 After all, as it is within the nature of the prisoner's
dilemma and the tragedy of the commons, there are no tools available
by which the co-prisoners can stop each other from choosing the
selfish course of action, even if that results in a less than optimal out-
come for the community as a whole.3 59
As a result, government intervention into environmental prob-
lems has come in the form of coercive regulatory action.36 While
education regarding harms of pollution and environmental degrada-
tion can be helpful and important in the same way that it can help the
prisoners understand the benefits of cooperation in order to appreci-
ate the full scope of the dilemma, such measures cannot by them-
selves solve the collective action problem presented.361 To achieve the
optimum beneficial outcome for both prisoners, coercive action de-
signed to ensure that neither prisoner confesses is necessary. In the
environmental context, this has meant that government regulations
must impose coercive restrictions on activities that degrade the envi-
ronment.3 62
2. The Conventional Understanding of Discrimination as Irrational
Behavior
Within civil rights scholarship, a similar understanding about the
underlying causes of discrimination has become increasingly ac-
35 Id.; see also RODGERS, supra note 229, at 39-42; see generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
s57 Elliott et al., supra note 355, at 324; see also RODGERS, supra note 229, at 39-42; see
generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
358 See Hardin, supra note 57.
3 See AXELROD, supra note 356, at 9.
m See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 5509 (2000).
361 SeeAxELROD, supra note 356, at 10-11.
362 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2000) (containing federal enforcement provisions of
RCRA).
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cepted.3 63 The conventional wisdom about discrimination, however,
has been quite different.364
Since the earlier part of the twentieth century, the conventional
wisdom has been that "racism ... is irrational,"3 65 because it is based
on well-known and persistent errors of judgment about others based
on racial group membership.366 The negative attributes ascribed by
racist beliefs to a racial group are either simply false or constitute un-
justifiably over-broad generalizations.3 67 Yet, these notions have ex-
erted a peculiar power.368 Unlike factual misconceptions or generali-
zations, beliefs rooted in prejudice and racism "are not reversible
when exposed to new knowledge."3 69 They persist in spite of facts to
the contrary.3 70
Some, such as Gary Becker, have sought to provide explanations
by locating discrimination not necessarily in irrational actions based
on faulty reasoning but rather in pre-rational thoughts.371 Thus, dis-
crimination is not the result of a "mistaken" belief about a particular
racial minority group but rather because the individual has a "taste for
M See infra notes 395-407 and accompanying text.
64 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 3-9 (1954).
365 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 643 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[r]acism is a terrible thing. It is irrational, destructive, and
mean.").
366 ALLPORT, supra note 364, at 3-9. Prior to the 20th century, beliefs in the superiority
of the "white race" over others was accepted by many as true. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1174 n.39 (1995); see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERI-
CAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 83-97 (1962). Since then,
the use of race and skin color as a criterion for legitimate distinctions between individuals
with regard to their character, merit, intelligence, and virtually all other personal charac-
teristics has been largely discredited. See generaUy STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF
MAN (1996) (discussing how racial prejudices have led to false scientific claims about racial
differences and the superiority of Caucasians). Nevertheless, because of their attractiveness
in explaining social inequality, such views resurface periodically. See, e.g., RICHARD J.
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE
IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). But see Stephen Jay Gould, Curveball, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 28,
1994, at 139.
367 Id.
8 ALLPORT, supra note 364, at 17-27.
m9 Id. at 9 (emphasis removed). Such "antipathy [is] based upon a faulty and
inflexible generalization" about racial distinctions and the inferiority of non-Caucasians.
Id.
370 MYRDAL, supra note 366, at 100. This has held especially true with regard to racial
beliefs about African-Americans. "In this magical sphere ... , the Negro is inferior, totally
independent of rational proofs or disproofs[;) he is inferior in a deep and mystical sense."
Id.
371 See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16-17 (2d ed.
1971).
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discrimination." 72 According to Becker's seminal 1957 treatment of
this issue, discrimination can be a response to an inherent desire by
an individual to avoid associating with members of particular racial
minority groups.3 73 Such desires have the status of inherent likes and
dislikes or values, similar to individual preferences for vanilla ice
cream over chocolate ice cream.3 74 Accordingly, prejudice and dis-
crimination are only symptoms and implementation mechanisms of
desires and values that cannot be explained or justified by, and in fact
precede, rational thought or logic.375
To be sure, even this kind of reliance on race in governmental
decision-making is considered "'utterly irrational,' and repugnant to
the principles of a free and democratic society" because it "rests on
the false premise that differences in race, or in the color of a person's
skin, reflect real differences that are relevant to a person's right to
share in the blessings of a free society."376 At bottom, the use of race is
considered an illegitimate and inappropriate criterion for distributing
the benefits of membership in our society.3 77
The conventional view of discrimination thus understands it as
behavior that is quite different from the type of behavior that results
in environmental degradation problems.378 Rather than being an un-
intended byproduct of individual pursuit of self-interest and personal
gain, as in the tragedy of the commons model3 79 and the prisoner's
dilemma, discrimination and racism are instead seen as either ends in
themselves, as a manifestation of a fundamental dislike of members of
other racial groups, or as "mistakes"-incorrect evaluations and
372 Id. at 16.
375 See id.
74 See id.
375 See id. at 16 n.4.
376 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985)); see also id. at 313-
14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the consideration of race in decisions regarding
jury service, use of public services, marriage, and child custody is "'utterly irrational' be-
cause it is completely unrelated to any valid public purpose"); ALLPORT, supra note 364, at
3-28 (discussing the unwarranted categorizations and beliefs that make up prejudice);
MYRDAL, supra note 366, at 97-101; Lawrence, supra note 75, at 331-39 (discussing psy-
choanalytic and cognitive explanations for the irrationality of prejudice).
377 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 489, 526-28 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring).
378 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Envi-
ronmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429, 1433 n.16
(1978) (stating that "civil rights matters do not ordinarily involve 'the tragedy of the com-
mons,' which operates to lead persons to maximize their own short run self-interest at the
expense of their long run welfare").
379 HARDIN, supra note 57.
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judgments about racial minorities.38 0 Discrimination, unlike environ-
mental degradation, is thus an unnatural phenomenon and the result
of the breakdown of ordinary and legitimate individual decision-
making processes. 381
This understanding indicates that education about the "mistake"
of racism and prejudice will not be sufficient as a remedy to overcome
discrimination. 382 Rather, because of its roots in pre-rational prefer-
ences against members of other racial groups, such preferences can
only be changed or eliminated by deeper personal changes in values
and attitudes toward other races-processes that depend as much and
maybe even more on personal relationships and interactions than on
governmental coercion and regulation. The power of this understand-
ing of discrimination is demonstrated by the significant success that
integration and diversity efforts in public education, the work place,
and housing have had in changing people's attitudes and behavior
toward racial minorities.
3. The Rationality of Discriminatory Behavior
Yet, in spite of the widespread acceptance of this understand-
ing,38 3 it is too simplistic. Explaining racism and prejudice only as the
result of pre-rational affinities and irrational judgments forecloses any
further analytical inquiries into the nature of discrimination and its
causes. After all, how can one analyze a phenomenon when it pre-
cedes (as pre-rational preference)384 or exists outside of (as a mis-
take) 3 85 any analytical framework?
In the end, this conventional understanding of discrimination
provides an incomplete view of the problem. It ignores the concept
that discrimination is a phenomenon, like environmental degrada-
tion, that is either an instrumental means for achieving other benefits
and advantages or is the by-product of normal, self-interested, rational
action.386
380 SeeBECKER, supra note 371, at 16-17; MYRDAL, supra note 366, at 100.
581 See BECKER, supra note 371, at 16-17; MYRDAL, supra note 366, at 100.
382 MYRDAL, supra note 366, at 100.
83 Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens,J. dissenting).
8 See BECKER, supra note 371, at 16-17.
M5 MYRDAL, supra note 366, at 100.
-36 Cass Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REv. 751, 753 (1991). In recent
years, increasing attention has also been focused on prejudice and discrimination as forms
of cognitive errors--errors of association and categorization. See infra note 395.
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For instance, in third-party discrimination,38 7 a restaurant owner
might engage in racial discrimination not because of his or her own
prejudice, but rather in response to traditional market forces.388 Thus,
in spite of having no "taste for discrimination" of his or her own, a
business owner might exclude prospective racial minority employees
or patrons from an establishment in order to cater to other patrons
who do harbor racial prejudices.389 The result is the familiar exclusion
of racial minorities from market transactions because of decreased
commercial opportunities. 390
A second form of racial discrimination that is the result of ra-
tional behavior arises out of the use of statistical evidence that appears
to document differences between racial groups. 3 91 Statistically based
discrimination is premised on the notion that generalizations about
racial minorities can serve as a predictor about particular members of
minority groups.3 92 For example, statistical evidence about the model
criminal suspect, including the suspects' most frequently recurring
race (the racial profile), could arguably serve as a useful predictor by
"lowering] the cost of obtaining and processing information, [and
thus] . .. the overall cost of doing the business of policing. "39 There
has, of course, been much criticism of racial profiling.3 94 But when
time and resource availability impose real constraints on the ability to
387 See id. at 754.
M8 Id.
389 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 245 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating
that a restaurant may have refused service to African-Americans where "'it' thought 'it'
could make more money by running a segregated restaurant"); see also BECKER, supra note
371, at 75-77; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
(1992) (arguing that employment discrimination can be a rational response by a firm to
increase productivity by reducing inter-group conflicts); Sunstein, supra note 386, at 754-
55.
390 BECKER, supra note 371, at 93-95. Housing segregation, lower home values, and
"white flight" from neighborhoods that slowly become inhabited by racial minorities, espe-
cially African-Americans, is one of the most salient expressions of third party discrimina-
tion.
391 Sunstein, supra note 386, at 755.
392 Id. at 755-57 (discussing use of statistical information as predictor in employment
decisions). In many respects, these racial profiles are little more than racial stereotypes,
albeit generated through more sophisticated methods.
393 See, e.g., Developments in the Law--Race and the Criminal Process: II. Racial Discrimina-
tion on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1494, 1503
(1988); Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at 30-31. See gener-
ally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw 136-67 (1997).
394 See generally Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425
(1997); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Mat-
ters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1999).
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gather information, the perceived utility to any particular law en-
forcement officer of using a racial profile with regard to reducing de-
cision-making time and costs might still make the use of such a gener-
alization nevertheless rational and possibly even efficient. 395
The third form of discrimination that is associated with rational
behavior exists as a manifestation of ordinary cooperative behavior
designed to advance the discriminator's interests. Like other forms of
group cooperation, racism and prejudice can serve as a means for
members of one racial group to cooperate with each other in order to
create or preserve advantages over non-members.3 96 Racism can thus
serve as a means of advantaging members of the more powerful racial
group over others.
At their most concrete, prejudice and racism have created a sys-
tem of racial privilege of Caucasians over racial minorities. Individuals
participate in the maintenance of such a system because of the pref-
erential employment or educational opportunities as well as other
economic and social advantages that being Caucasian affords.3 97 Yet,
this system need not provide only specific and concrete economic
395 In fact, the deliberate use of generalizations about racial groups in decision-making
is only the explicit use of cognitive categories that both Charles Lawrence and Linda
Krieger have argued are important causes for discrimination. Lawrence, supra note 75;
Krieger, supra note 366. Categorization allows us to simplify the task of making sense of our
daily experiences by filtering them through these categories. At the same time, categories
also simplify decision-making by allowing missing information to be inferred, thus facilitat-
ing action under conditions of uncertainty or imperfect information. Lawrence, supra note
75, at 324 (stating that "categorization" is a process by which "humans ... make sense of
experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully with each one on an
individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope."); see also Krieger, supra note 366, at
1188-90.
Yet, while categorization is a fact of life, it is not an entirely self-contained and inde-
pendent process, nor does it proceed in an objective and exact fashion. Category forma-
tion can be influenced by outside factors, including the stereotypes and categories of oth-
ers as well as those of prevailing culture and society. Krieger, supra note 366, at 1195-98.
Likewise, category formation can be affected by "'illusory correlations'-the subjective
perception of a strong correlation that objectively does not exist." Id. at 1195. In the race
context, these categorization defects explain how racial stereotypes are created and how
they are perpetuated from generation to generation. It also explains how the underlying
process, just like in the utilization of statistical information about race and crime, is essen-
tially a rational process-it is an attempt, even if flawed, of rationally processing and using
information in the face of real world constraints on available resources, time, and informa-
tion itself. See Lawrence, supra note 75, at 336.
39 See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw 63-68 (1900); Mi-
CHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
1960s TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994).
397 See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709, 1762
(1993).
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benefits. For example, even individuals of poor Caucasian working
class backgrounds, who have received little in terms of concrete
benefits from racism, are accorded, at a minimum, a higher social
status than racial minorities. 398 The resulting form of psychic satisfac-
tion can be seen as contributing to an individual's sense of well-being
or utility in the same sense that increased consumption of material
goods can.399 W.E.B. Du Bois observed as early as the 1930s that "the
white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were com-
pensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage" based on
the lower social status of racial minorities. 4°°
Of course, the days of segregation and other forms of officially
sanctioned discrimination aimed at preserving and perpetuating
white supremacy are over. Equal opportunity and racial equality are
now the idealized norms of the country. Yet, the truth of the recogni-
tion that members of the same group will tend to favor each other
over non-group members remains valid.4°1 That recognition is not
surprising to many who have argued for some time that self-interest
has perpetuated racism and discrimination against racial minorities,
albeit in different forms.4°2
B. The Substantive Failing of EPA's Title VI Regulatory Approach
Considered in this fashion, then, discrimination is little different
from the profit-maximizing behavior that leads to overuse of commu-
nal resources-it is, as Richard McAdams has characterized it, also a
form of market failure.4°3 Prejudice and discrimination are analogous
manifestations of efforts to achieve or preserve individual gain and
advantage.4°4 Rather than an individual imposing harm on the entire
community, the harm is imposed by members of the "in-group" on
398 See id. at 1791.
s99 See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Pro-
duction and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1084 (1995).
400 W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700 (1935).
401 Psychological experiments have, in fact, provided confirmation that explicit de-
lineations of group-membership, even ones based on random criteria, create a significant
bias of group members against non-members regardless of fairness and maximum mutual
gain considerations. Krieger, supra note 366, at 1192-93. Within the race context, this ex-
plains much of why discrimination arose in the first place, why it is so difficult to correct
prejudicial beliefs with facts to the contrary, and why remedial approaches to discrimina-
tion have been so elusive. See generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The EvolvingForms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).
402 E.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 26-50 (1987).
403 See McAdams, supra note 399, at 1074-78.
404 See id. at 1066.
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those of the "out-group."40 5 The ultimate motivation that gives rise to
the harm is the same.4°6 Individuals overuse commons resources not
because of evil intent or ill will, but rather because it is in their inter-
est to do so-because the individual reaps the full benefit of his or
her overuse of the commons, while only bearing a fraction of the
burden.40 7 Similarly, discrimination can be seen as resulting from un-
derlying economic and personal incentive structures that promote
racism and prejudice.408
There is no need for an individual to harbor specific ill will or
racial hatred toward racial minorities in order to engage in actions or
contribute to the perpetuation of structures that discriminate against
racial minorities. Pursuit of individual self-interest is sufficient motiva-
tion. Nor is it necessary that an individual consciously seeks to disad-
vantage racial minorities specifically for personal gain.4°9 Usually, the
perpetuation of existing institutions and structures that preserve the
unequal status quo-advantaging the majority at the expense of mi-
norities-is all that is needed. 410
Certainly, other explanations for discrimination and racial dis-
parities exist.411 But to the extent that discrimination finds its roots in
rational behavior, narrowly limited governmental intervention will be
405 Id. at 1014-16.
40W See id.
407 Of course, unregulated access does not only suggest lack of legal regulation, but
also suggests a lack of customary and other informal communal regulations, since such
informal regulations can ameliorate the tragedy of the commons. See Carol Rose, The Com-
edy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711,
742 (1986).
4o SeeMcAdams, supra note 399, at 1029-33.
409 The perpetuation of racial privileges and discrimination can usually be rationalized
through racial stereotypes and race-neutral norms, including institutional processes that
are historically biased against racial minorities. See McAdams, supra note 399, at 1072-74;
see generally Lopez, supra note 74. For example, the call for color-blindness and claims of
reverse discrimination arguably justify opposition to race-based remedial measures for past
discrimination, such as affirmation action.
410 Unlike environmental degradation, discrimination must be pursued in cooperation
with other members of the same racial group in order to successfully achieve its purpose.
By definition, the benefits of discrimination are not within the capacity of individuals to
achieve by themselves, because they depend inherently on interactions and relationships
with others-the preferential treatment or higher social status that is accorded to the dis-
criminator by others.
In fact, as McAdams has pointed out, social exclusion mechanisms, such as segrega-
tion, serve important purposes in maintaining group cohesion and ameliorating group-
internal prisoner dilemma-type problems that the occasional economic benefit of defec-
tion (i.e., the failure to discriminate) would present. See McAdams, supra note 399, at
1013-17.
411 See generally OMI & WINANT, supra note 396, at 9-47.
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insufficient to remedy the effects of discrimination. Government ac-
tions and anti-discrimination protections that focus on individual atti-
tudes and conduct about race alone and ignore the systemic and
structural aspects of it will not lead to real solutions. If discrimination
problems are not primarily problems of individual wrongdoing, but
rather a larger social pathology that shares similarities with larger
scale social problems, systematic and comprehensive government in-
tervention is necessary.412
This conclusion hearkens back to what some scholars and others
have emphasized for a long time-that the economic and structural
underpinnings of racial inequality must be addressed just as much as
individual attitudes in order to achieve true racial equality. Discrimi-
nation raises the same prisoner's dilemma issues that environmental
degradation raises, except that in discrimination, the pay-off matrix
for a discriminator provides the greatest benefit when he or she
chooses discrimination. Education, good will, and changing individ-
ual attitudes alone are unable to end discrimination and social ineq-
uities. 413 Just as environmental regulation has sought to reduce the
economic incentives for environmental degradation, to effectively ad-
dress discrimination, government may have to consider more explic-
itly the racial and distributional implications of decision-making and
institutional structures, and take more race-conscious actions.414
The inability to fully understand this has been one of the main
failings of EPA's current approach to environmental justice under the
Tide VI guidance. The Draft Revised Guidance, for example, requires
an adverse environmental human health impact to be cognizable. 41 5
As a practical matter, this is likely to mean that impacts must exceed
established human health or environmental benchmark values pro-
vided by statutes, EPA regulations, or EPA policy. 416 But the imposition
of such absolute thresholds fails to recognize that much behavior and
412 See, e.g., id.; Krieger, supra note 366; Lawrence, supra note 75.
413 See Elliott et al., supra note 355, at 325 (raising the irrelevance of the prosecutor's
role and acumen in the prisoner's dilemma). This understanding suggests that this form
of discrimination is arguably not as morally reprehensible as others-after all, the dis-
criminator does not harbor ill will per se toward the individual discriminated against. In-
stead, the harm results as a necessary by-product of the pursuit of self-interest. In contrast,
one could also argue that the foreseeable and deliberate harm to racial minorities im-
posed for purposes of furthering one's self-interest is in fact more morally reprehensible
than an unexplainable and innate racial hatred.
414 See e.g.,Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1130 (2000).
415 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,680-81.
416 Id.
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action that impose a greater burden on minority and poor communi-
ties may not rise to such thresholds. By focusing the Draft Revised
Guidance on only the most serious incidents, 417 such objectionable
behavior or activities will persist. Thus, rather than addressing the
substance of the problem-the incentives leading to such behavior-
it only addresses some of the symptoms.
A related problem arises with regard to the role of justification in
the Draft Revised Guidance.418 While the Draft Revised Guidance in-
dicates that "a goal that is legitimate, important, and integral to the
recipient's institutional mission" justifies a discriminatory impact,
"broader interests, such as economic development" may also justify
discriminatory impact "if the benefits are delivered directly to the af-
fected population."419
The intent behind this interpretation of justification might have
been noble, seeking to address the lack of economic development
and job opportunities in many poor and minority communities. But it
is likely to exacerbate the siting of undesirable facilities in such com-
munities. After all, it immunizes environmental decisions against chal-
lenges under Title V1420 and, as a result, is likely to attract more unde-
sirable facilities that cannot be sited anywhere else because of
community opposition. Thus, when the environmental justice com-
munity will need the protections of Title VI the most, such protections
may not be available because the economic development justification
permits significantly adverse disparate impacts. 421
Finally, the lack of specificity with regard to prohibited practices
or considerations is also significant. 4 2 The Draft Revised Guidance
does suggest a variety of approaches to compliance, ranging from the
comprehensive to the case-specific. 423 Its primary focus, however, is on
process issues, omitting more specific directions about the substantive
obligations that the disparate impact regulations impose. 424 For ex-
ample, details with regard to prohibited practices, methods of en-
forcement, and suggested remedial actions are missing.425 Without
417 Id.
418 See id. at 39,683.
419 Id.
M See id.
421 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,683.
M See id. at 39,657.
423 Id.
424 Id.
4 Letter from Lawyers' Committee, supra note 248, at 16-17.
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such detail, recipients will find it difficult to ensure that their actions
are not influenced by corrupting discriminatory biases and to con-
form their conduct to the disparate impact prohibitions of Title VI.
In the end, EPA's ad hoc, case-by-case approach to resolving envi-
ronmental justice complaints that the Title VI process sets out is in-
adequate for addressing the systemic and structural incentives that
will continue to disadvantage racial minority and poor communities.
Instead of reacting to problems raised by administrative complaints,
EPA must proceed to understand the biases against environmental
justice communities within its existing regulatory systems and pro-
actively seek out regulatory solutions.
IV. RE-EVALUATING THE ROLE OF TITLE VI AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Presently, no person would find acceptable the proposition that
industrial pollution should occur unregulated, precisely because of
the market failure problems described by Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of
the Commons.426 Yet, that has not always been so, as the severe pollution
problems of the 1950s and 60s and the lack of comprehensive con-
trols on polluting activities during those times demonstrate. Likewise,
public and open expressions of racial hatred and bigotry are socially
unacceptable today. But in the 50s and 60s, discrimination and segre-
gation were part of the social fabric of communities, and change re-
quired the radical intervention of the federal government.427 In both
contexts, change required people and businesses to fundamentally
alter what was previously socially accepted behavior or common prac-
tice; but that did not stop reformers.
The same is true for environmental justice. What will be neces-
sary is analogous structural reform. Yet, government has failed to take
the problem sufficiently seriously as a structural and systemic matter.
After all, any effective regulatory approach to environmental justice
issues must not only address the tensions between the regulatory
premises of civil rights law and environmental law; it must also focus
on the real life incentives that lead to discrimination and distribu-
tional inequities in the same way that environmental regulation has
focused on those real life incentives that lead to environmental deg-
radation.
426 See HARDIN, supra note 57.
47 See discussion supra Introduction.
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The application of such an understanding raises some important
questions. In spite of this recognition, is there nevertheless an issue as
to the competency of EPA in addressing discrimination issues? How
can the majoritarian tendencies of a politically controlled administra-
tive agency 428 be tempered so as to provide effective minority protec-
tions? And what ought a constructive role for Title VI be within EPA's
efforts to achieve environmental justice?
A. Incorporating Civil Rights into Environmental Regulation: Assessing
EPA's Institutional Competence
Even if one can improve consideration of civil rights concerns
through environmental regulatory processes, the ultimate question of
competence remains. This conundrum is embodied in two closely re-
lated questions that appear to have made environmental regulators
reluctant to address civil rights issues in their work: (1) Can environ-
mental regulators adequately consider and implement civil rights val-
ues?; and (2) Should bureaucrats be involved in administering civil
rights values and norms? 429
As discussed above, many of the difficulties that EPA has encoun-
tered in addressing the civil rights and equity issues of environmental
justice are embedded in the regulatory and institutional framework of
environmental protection.430 Its decision-making processes and insti-
tutions seem unsuited to the types of judgments that must be made in
the civil rights context. Given that an adequate understanding of and
ability to deal with civil rights and discrimination concerns requires
knowledge of the history of race relations, the sociology and psychol-
ogy of inter-personal and institutional racial dynamics, and the coun-
ter-majoritarian protection needs of racial minorities, a cadre of tech-
nically and quantitatively inclined agency employees seems entirely
unequipped to the task. Delicate social value and political judgments
are arguably not within the competence of such a technical expert
agency. In fact, the use of administrative and technical decision-
making processes pre-supposes that a significant amount of consensus
must exist about the methodology, such as race-blind versus race-
conscious approaches, and values upon which a decision is to be
428 See discussion supra Part II.
4 These descriptive and normative questions are closely related because, arguably, if
the competency exists, then it should be utilized. Conversely, if there is an appropriate role
and mandate to address such issues, EPA should acquire the competency.
40 See discussion supra Part I.C.
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based. Such a consensus largely does not exist, or at a minimum is
fiercely contested in the civil rights context. Congress can supply
some of these methodologies or values through specific statutory
mandates. But it has largely not done so.
Federal agencies have been involved in the administration of civil
rights laws.The roles of agencies such as the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) and the Departments of Education
and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in advancing civil
rights demonstrate the functions that agencies can fulfill in this re-
gard.431 However, unlike some other agencies, EPA also does not have
an agency-specific congressional statutory mandate to consider civil
rights and equity issues within its regulatory functions.
But even if it has an impoverished institutional experience in
dealing with such issues, why can it not acquire such experience
through its own efforts to address environmental justice issues? After
all, agencies such as the EEOC and the Departments of Education
and Housing and Urban Development were not created fully-formed
with all of the experience necessary to fulfill their statutory missions.
Like all agencies, their institutional expertise evolved with the acquisi-
tion of institutional experience over time.
As a practical matter, since EPA is a member of the family of fed-
eral agencies in the executive branch, it can draw on the civil rights
knowledge and experiences of other agencies, including ones such as
the Departments of Justice, Education, and Housing and Urban De-
velopment. For example, with regard to its formulation of the Title VI
Draft Revised Guidance, EPA closely cooperated with and was subject
to the supervision of the Department of Justice.4s2 Ultimately, supervi-
sion by the President and assistance by other agencies should alleviate
competency concerns. Objections that such efforts will not be easy
because they will require significant changes to how EPA conducts its
business are merely excuses for avoiding the substantive calls for envi-
ronmental justice rather than reasons why EPA cannot change.
A broader issue is raised by the relationship of environmental
discrimination and inequity with larger patterns of discrimination and
inequity within society. Many of the difficulties encountered by EPA in
addressing the deeper structural and systemic aspects of discrimina-
tion and inequity in environmental justice are arguably symptomatic
431 See supra note 203.
432 See Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,651; see also Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995, 72,995-97 (Nov. 2,1980).
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of the inadequacies of more generally prevailing legal understandings
and approaches to race issues. 433 Thus, one might argue that the
problem is with the existing legal system as a whole rather than just
the environmental regulatory system.434 Accordingly, the difficulties
should be addressed by the government as a whole, through some
inter-agency effort directed by the Executive Branch, rather than EPA
specifically.435 EPA's efforts arguably should be secondary to inter-
agency, government-wide efforts.
It would be an abdication, however, of EPA's larger societal re-
sponsibilities as well as its specific statutory obligations under Title VI,
if it failed to pro-actively engage civil rights and equity issues within its
regulatory jurisdiction. As an agency of the federal government, EPA
has an independent responsibility, under the Constitution as well as
the various federal civil rights statutes, including Tide VI, to redress
discrimination issues within its regulatory programs.
Civil rights statutes such as Title VI were, by design, addressed to
all federal agencies rather than a few specific ones. 4 6 Title VI recog-
nizes the pervasive nature of racial discrimination and the special re-
sponsibility of the federal government to ensure that it does not be-
come complicit in such discrimination through its funding
assistance.4 7 By seeking to prevent racial discrimination in the activi-
ties of recipients of federal funds, Title VI, by necessity, cannot speak
only to a few select federal agencies but must direct itself to all agen-
cies dispensing federal funds.438 Even if EPA is less experienced in
433 See generally supra Part II.C.1.
434 But see Yang, supra note 24.
435 In fact, the Executive Order on Environmental Justice established such an inter-
agency working group to address environmental justice issues as a government-wide mat-
ter. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994); see also An Integrated
Federal Interagency Environmental Justice Action Agenda, at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/
main/ej/iwg/actionagenda.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
436 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 (2000).
437 President Kennedy, in his statement accompaying his proposal for the Civil Rights
Act, stated to Congress that "[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all tax-
payers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches,
subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination." See H.R. Doc. No. 124 (1963), reprinted in
1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1534.
438 More importantly, the types of discrimination and equity issues implicated by EPA's
regulatory activities are quite different from those dealt with by agencies such as the EEOC
or HUD. Rather than attempting to balance the specific interests of individuals and the
impacts on inter-personal relationships, the vast bulk of the discrimination and fairness
issues raised by EPA's regulatory activities relates to the impact of governmental regulatory
decisions and business activities on individuals or small communities. In that sense, EPA's
task in addressing discrimination and equity issues is much like the traditional regulatory
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dealing with civil rights issues than agencies such as the EEOC, EPA's
role is no less important within larger efforts to promote racial equal-
ity. And while EPA's statutory mission is focused on issues other than
civil rights, the civil rights laws elevate its obligations to address civil
rights concerns to a level no less important than its environmental
priorities. 439
By making each individual agency responsible for ensuring non-
discrimination in the federal funds that it administers, Title VI recog-
nizes that discrimination comes in different forms and shapes.44°
Regulatory solutions that might apply to the discrimination issues
faced by one agency might not be applicable to those faced by an-
other.
Finally, and most importantly, as a federal agency, EPA does not
act independent of the remaining federal government. It is, within
the executive branch, subject to the control of the President and ac-
countable in that fashion.441 With regard to the mandates of Title VI,
Congress made such accountability explicit.442 EPA's actions are ulti-
mately attributable to the President as head of the executive
branch.443 As an entity accountable to the President, whose responsi-
bilities reach much further than the environmental mission of EPA to
include the safe-guarding of civil rights, EPA's actions should be
equally mindful of such broader responsibilities.
The crucial question in considering EPA's role in addressing civil
rights and larger issues of fairness and equity is not whether EPA is
competent to do so, or whether it should take the necessary yet
difficult steps of achieving effective solutions to issues of environ-
mental justice, but rather, what steps need to be taken to make its
regulatory framework become more responsive to such issues.
actions it takes in other areas and is much less politically and socially sensitive than that of
other agencies.
439 Title VI ensures that its anti-discrimination concerns are not elevated over EPA's
environmental priorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
440 See id.
441 Of course, such control may be limited by Congress. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 664 (1988); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935). See
generally MASHAW ET AL., supra note 200, at 169-280.
442 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; see also Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A
Regulatory Model for Dejining "Discrimination, "70 GEo. L.J. 1, 29, 31 (1981).
443 SeeAbernathy, supra note 442, at 31.
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B. Taking Minority Protection Seriously in Administrative Proceedings: The
Place of Administrative Adjudicative Processes
As discussed above, one of EPA's principal difficulties has not
been a failure to act on environmental justice issues, but rather a fail-
ure to confront the institutional and structural biases against the in-
terests advanced by the environmental justice movement. 444 The envi-
ronmental laws' majoritarian orientation and their methodological
bias toward quantifiable considerations have made incorporating civil
rights concerns inherently difficult.445 An effective approach to envi-
ronmental justice issues must include a process that resolutely pro-
tects the interests of those raising minority concerns and takes envi-
ronmental justice concerns seriously.
This recognition re-emphasizes the inadequacy of EPA's Title VI
Guidance. As noted previously, the entire process of investigating and
deciding Title VI complaints is based on a process that is subject to
political, and thus majoritarian, control.446 This orientation is exacer-
bated by the historically and institutionally close relationship that EPA
has had with state and local governments-the primary targets of ad-
ministrative Title VI complaints-and the attempts by the Guidance to
extend some form of deference to state and local government." 7
The lack of real concern by the Guidance with minority protec-
tion issues and the interests of Title VI complainants is especially clear
in EPA's statement regarding who ultimately controls the Title VI pro-
cess: EPA and the federal fund recipient.4" Thus, "EPA does not rep-
resent the complainants, but rather the interests of the federal gov-
ernment, in ensuring nondiscrimination by its recipients."449 The
complainant may provide relevant information about the discrimina-
tion allegations, but he or she has no right of participation within the
"See discussion supra Part I.B.
445 See discussion supra Part I.B.
446 See discussion supra Part I.C.
47 In such an environment, it seems inevitable that the "regulatory capture" of EPA by
such interests will occur. See Stewart, supra note 208, at 1682-88, 1713-15. One would not
expect the "capture" of the Title VI process to be obvious in the sense that most meritori-
ous claims will be denied outright. Rather, it can be expected that review of Title VI claims
will be perfunctory and technical in nature, and that claims that are not obviously merito-
rious will not receive the serious consideration they deserve. Arguably, this already hap-
pened in the context of EPA's handling of the Select Steel matter. See Select Steel Com-
plaint Letter, supra note 118.
4"8 Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidance, supra note 17, at
39,672.
449 I.
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administrative process.45° And most importantly, the complainant has
no right of appeal of an adverse determination on the complaint.451
In contrast, the federal fund recipient has the full panoply of partici-
patory rights, including the right to administratively appeal any ad-
verse decision. 452
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval has
done little to alleviate this disparity.453 While alternative avenues, such
as suits under Section 1983, may keep open a significant avenue for
private plaintiffs to pursue Title VI disparate impact claims in court,454
there remains a patent disparity in legal rights and remedies that in-
dividuals and communities complaining about the Title VI violations
have in comparison to the targets of such complaints. 45 5 After all, the
administrative process was designed largely to allow complainants to
avoid the expense, delay, and other burdens of litigation because of
the enormous obstacles that such issues present to Title VI complain-
ants seeking to vindicate their claims. 45 6 Therefore, it proves that
EPA's administration of laws protecting minority groups and the poor
is subject to political control.457
A change in this key failing of EPA's Title VI Guidance could
significantly improve the consideration of minority interests in regula-
tory processes. 458 As noted above, judicial decision-making is more
solicitous of minority rights and incommensurable values than agency
processes. Incorporating the attributes of the judicial process more
closely into agency structures would improve minority protections
within EPA's administrative decision-making.
The availability of administrative adjudicative processes under
Title VI could significantly address these concerns.459 Of course, ad-
ministrative law judges are not entirely independent of political con-
trol and do not have the broad public policy perspectives of Article III
4 Id.
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 See 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001) (foreclosing a private right of action for individual plain-
tiffs to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations directly in federal court).
4m See Mank, supra note 165.
455 Id. But see South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771 (3d Cir. 2001).
456 Moreover, deferential review of agency actions by courts may largely insulate agency
implementation of Tide VI regulations from further challenge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2; see
also Abernathy, supra note 442, at 39; Letter from Lawyers' Committee, supra note 248, at 5.
457 See Letter from Lawyers' Committee, supra note 248, at 5.
4u See generally id. at 5-7.
49 See generally MASHAW ET AL., supra note 200, at 286-438.
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federal judges.460 Nevertheless, they are more insulated from political
pressures than other agency employees461 and can thus be expected to
implement some politically unpopular demands more readily than
might be possible through other agency processes. 462 Therefore, if
minority protections suffer because of political pressure, administra-
tive law judges can be expected to resist such pressures more easily
than other agency employees.
Shifting decision-making control over environmental justice
complaints to adjudicative processes without more reform, however,
would only partially address problems of administrative decision-
making. To improve the consideration of the incommensurables of
environmental justice, administrative law judges would have to be-
come more educated and cognizant of the history and concerns of
civil rights law and the role of distributional equity and procedural
fairness in public policy.46 The mixed outcomes of past EPA adminis-
trative decisions addressing environmental justice issues appear to
confirm a lack of familiarity with and commitment to racial equality
and social equity concerns.464 Without a greater appreciation of these
issues, adjudicative processes are unlikely to significantly improve the
consideration of environmental justice concerns. But more impor-
tantly, failure to change in this regard might simply return decision-
making to the rote application of traditional civil rights jurisprudence
without careful consideration of how the administrative agency
mechanisms impact the application of this jurisprudence.
A recent decision by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission suggests that adjudicative proc-
esses can produce more searching inquiries with regard to the regula-
tory significance of racial and socio-economic disparate impacts. 465 In
4 Federal judges are selected by political processes in the first place, and as a matter
of practical reality, are not entirely free from political pressures. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note
172, at 1307-08.
461 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 22.8 (2001) (limiting ex parte communications by administra-
tive law judges and other agency officials connected to administrative proceedings during
pendency of process). See generally id. § 22.
462 See Chayes, supra note 172, at 1307-08 (asserting that judges have a "professional
ideal of reflective and dispassionate analysis of the problem before [them] and [are] likely
to have had some experience in putting this ideal into practice").
460 See Richard Lazarus, Integrating EnvironmentalJustice into EPA Permitting Authority, 26
ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 655-77 (1999).
46 See id.
46 In re Louisiana Energy Serv., 47 N.R.C. 77, 100-07 (1998) (finding that NEPA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000), required the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to consider
environmental justice impacts in the Commission's licensing process, and remanding a
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that decision, the Board found that in light of the requirements of the
Executive Order on Environmental Justice, the siting of a uranium
enrichment facility in predominately poor and African-American
communities raised potential racial discrimination issues. 46 The deci-
sion itself has not been a panacea for environmental justice advocates
because, on appeal to the politically appointed Commission members,
the reach of the administrative decision was significantly curtailed. 467
And ultimately, every administrative adjudicative decision is subject to
review by politically appointed and accountable agency heads. 468
Nevertheless, administrative adjudicative processes arguably pro-
vide at least a starting point for taking a more serious look at chang-
ing the framework that so ill-serves environmental justice interests.469
They hold out the potential for far more principled and transparent
decision-making with regard to minority concerns.470 And to the ex-
tent that environmental justice groups raise specific claims of dis-
crimination and inequity, the characteristics of adjudicatory processes
make them more suitable as mechanisms that will fairly address their
concerns than other established agency processes. 471
C. The Scope of Regulatory Discretion Under Title VI and Environmental
Statutes: Following the Path of NEPA
Incorporation of adjudicative processes cannot be the sole an-
swer to the improved consideration of environmental justice concerns
because most agency decision-making processes cannot be adjudica-
tory. After all, the primary policy rationale for the creation of admin-
istrative agencies was to avoid the strictures of adjudicative processes
that the common law posed for the technical and complex problems
of environmental protection. Moreover, such process changes do not
alter the substantive regulatory requirements that govern such deci-
sions in the first place. To the extent that such regulatory require-
ments are hostile to or do not allow the consideration of discrimina-
nuclear material license for agency review to determine whether such concerns were ade-
quately considered); see also Sheila Foster, Impact Assessment, in THE LAw OF ENVIRON-
MENTALJUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra
note 34, at 272-82.
46 See 47 N.R.C. at 104-06.
467 See Foster, supra note 465, at 276-82.
468 Id.
469 Id.
470 Id.
471 Id.
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tion or equity concerns, changing the process of decision-making will
ultimately accomplish little. These limitations point out that another
key step that EPA must take is to make more substantive changes
within its regulatory processes.
Title VI potentially offers one important opportunity to achieve
this goal. To realize the utility of Title VI, however, EPA will have to
move beyond the use of its Title VI regulations purely as an enforce-
ment tool of narrow conceptions of discrimination against federal
fund recipients, as it has within its Title VI Guidance. Instead, EPA will
need to utilize them more substantively as a source of authority for
defining what types of actions lead to unacceptable discriminatory
outcomes.472 At the same time, EPA must also heed more carefully the
implicit call in Title VI to incorporate environmental justice consid-
erations into all of its regulatory activities, a call that has been raised
in the past with regard to the mandates of the Executive Order on
Environmental Justice. 47s In essence, these tasks require EPA to ad-
dress discrimination as a concern that shares much in common with
issues of environmental degradation-a pervasive problem that is
structural in nature.474
The value of Title VI to these tasks is in its delegation of
significant congressional authority to federal agencies to determine
the prohibited forms of discrimination. 475 In the past, this delegation
472 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000). Title VI was designed to prompt agency ac-
tion because, as the Supreme Court recognized in the context of discrimination against
the handicapped, much discrimination continues to be a present-day problem because of
apathy, subconscious aversions, and the ease with which discrimination is perpetuated. See
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985).
473 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
474 For example, Heidi Gorovitz Robertson has pointed out that grandfathering of pol-
lution permits has a significant impact on minority communities. Heidi Gorovitz Robert-
son, If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and
Their Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 131, 177-79 (1995).
475 Thus, the legislative history indicates that Congress intentionally left unclear what
types of discrimination might be covered and subsequently prohibited within Tide VI. See
generally Abernathy, supra note 442, at 29-30. The rationale behind the discretion that was
thus delegated to agencies was that different agency missions and regulatory structures
called for different anti-discrimination protections. See id. (reviewing legislative history); see
also Choate, 469 U.S. at 293-94.
The plain meaning of the text reveals Congress' intent to provide the relevant agen-
cies with sufficient authority to transform the statute's broad aspiration into social reality.
So too does a lengthy, consistent, and impassioned legislative history that strongly indicates
that the Congress that adopted Title VI and the administration that proposed the statute
both intended that agencies and departments would utilize the authority granted under
§ 602 to shape the substantive contours of § 601. For example, during the hearings that
preceded the passage of the statute, Attorney General Robert Kennedy agreed that the
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of authority was used by agencies to promulgate regulations that pro-
hibit discriminatory impacts as well as intentional discrimination. 47
6
As Charles Abernathy argued two decades ago, however, this delega-
tion of authority also calls on agencies such as EPA to adopt an under-
standing of Tide VI based on a regulatory model of law making with
broadly delegated powers and regulatory discretion to pursue anti-
discrimination objectives. 477 The Supreme Court has largely agreed
with this understanding of Tide VI. 478
This model of federal law making is all too familiar to EPA. Fed-
eral environmental statutes delegate a significant amount of authority
to EPA so that it may promulgate regulations that implement broad
congressional mandates. 479 Tide VI is little different in this respect.480
EPA's regulatory experience with the pervasive nature of polluting
activities and the incentives that affect activities leading to environ-
mental degradation has given it a regulatory perspective and experi-
administrators of the various agencies would have the power to define 'what constitutes
discrimination" under Title VI and 'what acts or omissions are to be forbidden." Civil
Rights-The President's Program, 1963: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 399-400 (1963); see also Civil Rights: Hearings Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2740 (1963) (including remarks of Attorney General Kennedy) (stat-
ing only after the agencies "establish the rules" will recipients "understand what they can
and cannot do"). It was, in fact, concern for this broad delegation that inspired Congress
to amend the pending bill to ensure that all regulations issued pursuant to Title VI would
have to be approved by the President. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000); Alexander v. Sando-
val, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1529-31, 1532 n.19 (2001) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
476 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 642 n.12 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress expected most interstitial lawmaking [for Title VI] to
be performed by administrative agencies, not courts."); Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F3d
1121 (6th Cir. 1996). At the same time, making such regulations subject to the approval of
the President also addressed concerns about political accountability and narrow institu-
tional competencies with regard to the ability to consider discrimination issues. See Aber-
nathy, supra note 442, at 31. The President delegated this approval authority to the Attor-
ney General. Exec. Order No. 12,250, Leadership and Coordination of Implementation
and Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Laws, 42 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980).
477 See also Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 622-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Adams v. Bell,
711 F2d 161, 181-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wright,J, dissenting); Abernathy, supra note 442.
478 Choate, 469 U.S. at 293-94 (stating that Title VI "delegated to the agencies.., the
complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted
sufficiently significant social problems, and were readily enough remediable, to warrant
altering the practices of federal grantees that had produced those impacts"); Guardians
Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592.
479 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984).
480 SeeAlexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1532 (2001) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
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ence uniquely situated to address the pervasive nature and structural
aspects of discrimination through Tide VI.481
Arguably, since Title VI does not apply to EPA's activities itself,
there could be inconsistent treatment-EPA might hold federal fund
recipients to a higher or different standard than it holds its own regu-
latory activities. Yet, rather than holding itself to a lower standard,
EPA should do more within its own activities to address the pervasive
discrimination within American society. It must put into substantive
practice what the Executive Order on Environmental Justice called on
agencies to do in 1994-to incorporate environmental justice into all
of their regulatory activities.48 2
In considering the expansive concern with unintentional dis-
crimination by federal fund recipients and agency discretion under
Tide VI to address such discrimination, EPA has taken few substantive
steps within its own programmatic activities. The recognition of the
pervasiveness of discrimination and the authority delegated to EPA
with respect to discrimination by federal fund recipients indicates that
it must do much more to address the structural issues that cause and
contribute to discrimination and inequity in environmental regula-
tion. Further, EPA must take environmental justice concerns seriously
as a substantive and programmatic matter, not just as a matter of pub-
lic relations.
In many respects, these criticisms should be familiar to EPA. In
1969, Congress passed NEPA in order to force all federal agencies to
consider the environmental consequences of their actions before
making decisions. 48 3 This principle has become most visibly embodied
in NEPA's requirement that agencies prepare environmental impact
statements that inform agency decisionmakers about the potential
environmental consequences of particular agency decisions.484 While
NEPA has had no substantive core, imposing only procedural re-
quirements that must be satisfied before an administrative agency ac-
tion can be finalized, it was also designed by Congress to change the
very fabric of administrative decision-making. 4 5 By forcing agencies to
481 In this respect, EPA's traditional focus on utilitarian outcomes, and less on process
values, can actually help it address this underlying contribution to discrimination. See gen-
erally Tseming Yang, Balancing Interests and Maximizing Rights in Environmental Justice, 23 VT.
L. REV. 529 (1999).
482 See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
483 Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Jan. 1, 1970)).
4 See generally ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NA-
TURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 612-19 (2d ed. 1998).
05 Id.
[Vol. 29:143
HeinOnline  -- 29 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L Rev. 224 2001-2002
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Environmental Justice
interpret and administer all "policies, regulations, and public laws of
the United States... in accordance with the policies set forth" under
NEPA, 486 it was designed to make them more aware of such conse-
quences and ultimately to prompt agencies to alter their actions so as
to minimize environmental harm.487
The parallels to the broad mandate of Title VI to ensure non-
discrimination by federal fund recipients should be apparent. In a
sense, what Title VI calls on agencies to do-incorporate anti-
discrimination protections into the programs receiving federal fund-
ing-is quite similar to NEPA's mandate to incorporate environ-
mental considerations into agency decision-making.4 88 The implicit
purpose of Title VI, however, is significantly more substantive in na-
ture: full incorporation and implementation of Title VI's discrimina-
tion prohibitions in all of EPA's regulatory decision-making proc-
esses.489
From this perspective, the failure of EPA to heed Title VI's larger
purpose of incorporating civil rights is particularly ironic. After all,
EPA is the primary agency charged by Congress with monitoring
agency compliance with NEPA.490 Of course, EPA itself has largely
been exempted by the courts from the very application of NEPA be-
cause it is considered to perform functionally equivalent environ-
mental analyses in those exempted programmatic activities.491 The
exemption underscores not only that EPA has an appropriate role in
- ' 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
487 See Calvert's Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Agency,
449 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
-' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A).
489 Of course, Tide VI appears to provide EPA with broad regulatory discretion in how
to implement this goal. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 293-94 (1985). But the exercise
of such discretion, and what appropriate anti-discrimination requirements ought to be,
would arguably be significantly affected by different premises about the role of anti-
discrimination within environmental protection. Such premises are at issue here.
490 As the agency empowered to review and comment on the adequacy of environ-
mental impact statements "from the standpoint of public health or welfare or environ-
mental quality," EPA was essentially charged with ensuring that human health and envi-
ronmental quality concerns became issues of primary concern not only to EPA and a few
other agencies with environmental missions, but also to the federal government as a
whole. Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7509; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1504.1 (b) (2001). Within
the NEPA scheme, EPA is specifically charged with reviewing and commenting on envi-
ronmental impact statements. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321. Ultimately, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality is the entity charged with judging the adequacy of agency implementation
of NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4344; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517; seeAndrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347,
358 (1979).
491 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wyoming v.
Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975).
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ensuring the compliance with broad statutes such as NEPA and Title
VI by other governmental actors, but also that it has a legitimate role
in doing so even if it itself is not subject to those regulatory require-
ments.
There is yet another implication that the functional equivalent
exemption raises-the need for EPA to make much more serious ef-
forts within its programmatic activities to achieve the substantive goals
of Title VI, even if it is not subject to Title VI. EPA must make more
purposeful efforts in exploring and applying the various legal authori-
ties it already possesses under its federal environmental statutes to
address discrimination and equity issues. As Richard Lazarus has
pointed out, and as acknowledged by EPA itself, such authority does
exist within EPA's various regulatory statutes.492 EPA must now actually
use this statutory authority to improve the incorporation of environ-
mental justice issues into its own regulatory activities.
One step that has been suggested is the incorporation of envi-
ronmental justice considerations into the enforcement process, and
in particular the assessment of penalties for regulatory violations.49
For instance, section 113(e) (1) of the Clean Air Act allows EPA to
consider "such other factors as justice may require" in determining
the penalty that is to be assessed.494 Increasing penalties based on dis-
criminatory impacts could serve as a deterrent, and thus a disincen-
tive, to greater pollution burdens imposed on environmental justice
communities. Such increased penalties could outweigh the benefits a
polluter might gain from the decreased likelihood of detection of vio-
lations and lower enforcement rates in environmental justice com-
munities.
EPA's efforts, including its recently issued Title VI Guidance, may
be the beginning of a long-term strategy to address and incorporate
harms to environmental justice communities comprehensively into
environmental regulation. And EPA's attempts to change its culture to
listen more carefully to the complaints of environmental justice advo-
cates are commendable.
492 See Lazarus, supra note 463; see also ENVTL. LAW INST., OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANC-
ING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. EPA STATUTORY AUTHORITIES (2001);
EPA 'Buried'1994 Plansfor Major EnvironmentaJustice Roadmap, INSIDE E.PA. WEEKLY REP.,
Special Report, Mar. 3, 2000.
493 See Lazarus, supra note 463, at 636-37, 641.
494 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) (1); see also Clean Water Act § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)
(2000); Safe Drinking Water Act § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (3) (referencing the "serious-
ness of violation").
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As noted above, however, EPA has yet to confront some key ob-
stacles inherent in its institutional structure and methodological ap-
proaches. In particular, EPA's long delay in identifying appropriate
statutory authority, without even beginning the process of acting on
such authority, does not speak well to EPA's commitment to accom-
plishing the ultimate goal.495 Moreover, little has been done to begin
incorporating such authorities into its regulatory decision-making
processes.496 Such steps are crucial for any regulatory approach that
takes the anti-discrimination and equity needs of the environmental
justice movement as seriously as EPA's traditional environmental pro-
tection mission.
CONCLUSION
EPA's attempts to address environmental justice issues by import-
ing civil rights approaches into environmental regulatory schemes
have largely been unsatisfactory and have given rise to serious criti-
cisms. 4 97 Much of this can be traced back to a failure to create appro-
priate regulatory approaches to environmental justice as well as the
lack of a substantive understanding of environmental justice con-
cerns.4 98 In creating a more effective process for dealing with envi-
ronmental justice complaints, EPA will have to adjust both the form
and substance of its regulatory mechanisms by considering more
specifically minority protection concerns and incommensurable val-
ues . It must also adopt a more comprehensive regulatory approach
that focuses on the structural incentives of discrimination.
In a way, the analysis reemphasizes the important lesson of the
last several decades for environmental protection: a healthy and liv-
able environment cannot be preserved or restored without proactive
495 It took EPA almost six years to provide a partial analysis of existing legal authorities
to address environmental justice issues within its regulatory activities.
496 For example, the incorporation of environmental justice considerations into its
NEPA process is another important step forward in this regard. See National Environ-
mental Justice Advisory Council Workgroup on Waste Transfer Stations, Notice of Public
Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,045 (Oct. 29, 1998); see also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT (1997), at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/main/ej/docs/epafin.pdf (last visited Jan. 16,
2002); U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES (1994), at http://es.
epa.gov/oeca/ofa/ejepa.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2002). Yet, few of EPA's environmental
regulatory processes are subject to NEPA. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
497 See discussion supra Part II.
498 See discussion supra Part III.
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efforts that challenge the status quo and seek changes to existing
structures and institutions. The same is true for efforts aimed at
achieving the ideals of equality and a just society.
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